SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE, VA
                                      MAY 8TH-18TH, 1864

                     Spottsylvania Court House, Va., May 8-18, 1864.  Army of
                the Potomac.  At 3 p.m. on May 7, while the Army of the
                Potomac was still on the battle-field of the Wilderness, a
                messenger arrived at Grant's headquarters with the information
                that Gen. Butler, with the Army of the James, had landed at
                City Point, completely surprising the Confederates there, and
                was ready to advance on Richmond.  Lee had retired behind his
                works, leaving open the road to Richmond round his right
                flank, and as soon as the intelligence of Butler's successful
                beginning was received Grant issued orders for a night march
                of the whole army toward Spottsylvania Court House.  (For the
                organization of the Army of the Potomac at this time see
                Wilderness.)  From the Wilderness a road ran east to
                Chancellorsville, where it was intersected by another that ran
                southeast to Piney Branch Church.  The Brock road ran in a
                southeasterly direction to Spottsylvania and about 3 miles
                south of it, and nearly parallel to it, ran the Shady Grove
                road.  The former was in possession of the Federals as far as
                Todd's tavern and the latter was in the hands of the enemy.
                Beyond Todd's tavern the Brock road was held by the
                Confederate cavalry under Stuart.  From the tavern the
                Catharpin road ran southwest and intersected the southern road
                at Shady Grove Church.  Gen. Warren, commanding the 5th corps
                was to move by the Brock road and was to be followed by Gen.
                Hancock with the 2nd corps, while the 6th and 9th corps,
                respectively commanded by Gen. Sedgwick and Gen. Burnside,
                were directed to move by way of Chancellorsville and Piney
                Branch Church.  Gen. Sheridan, commanding the cavalry, was
                ordered to "have a sufficient force on the approaches from the
                right to keep the corps commanders advised in time of the
                approach of the enemy."  The trains and reserve artillery were
                moved to Chancellorsville in the afternoon from which point
                they were to follow the army.  Nearly parallel to the course
                of the army ran the Po river on the south.  The Catharpin road
                crossed this river at Corbin's bridge, the Shady Grove road at
                what was known as the Block House bridge, and the road running
                from Spottsylvania to Richmond crossed it at Snell's bridge
                about 2 miles south of the Court House.  Some controversy and
                criticism have been indulged in as to why these bridges were
                not taken possession of by the Federal forces.  Badeau, in his
                Military History of Grant, says: "These bridges were of first
                importance for they commanded Lee's only approaches to
                Spottsylvania, and Sheridan, who had been ordered to keep a
                good look-out toward the enemy disposed his force so as to
                secure all three positions. * * * Had these orders
                (Sheridan's) been carried out, every avenue to Spottsylvania
                would have been closed to the rebel army."  Sheridan's corps
                consisted of the three divisions commanded by Gregg, Merritt
                and Wilson.  His instructions to Gregg, issued at 1 a.m on the
                8th, show the disposition of his forces with regard to the
                bridges.  They were as follows: "Move with your command at 5
                a.m., on the Catharpin road crossing at Corbin's bridge, and
                taking position at Shady Grove Church.  Gen. Merritt will
                follow you, and at Shady Grove Church will take the left hand,
                or Block House road, moving forward and taking up position at
                that point (viz., Block House).  Immediately after he has
                passed, you will move forward with your division, on the same
                road to the crossing of the Po river, where you will take up
                position supporting Gen. Merritt.  Gen. Wilson with his
                division will march from Alsop's by way of Spottsylvania Court
                House and the Gate to Snell's bridge, where he will take up
                position."

                     Before the hour fixed for the cavalry to move, Corbin's
                bridge and the Block House bridge were both in the hands of
                the enemy.  Snell's bridge was not used by the Confederates,
                nor was any attempt made to use it, because it was too far out
                of the way.  When Lee learned, on the afternoon of the 7th, of
                the movement of the Federal trains, his first impression was
                that Grant was falling back to Fredericksburg and determined
                to interpose a force between him and Richmond.  He therefore
                ordered Longstreets corps, now commanded by Gen. R. H.
                Anderson, Longstreet having been wounded in the battle of the
                Wilderness, to move to Spottsylvania that night, to be
                followed by Ewell's corps at daylight the next morning.
                Anderson moved at 11 p.m. and at daylight his advance had
                reached the Block House bridge.  Had Gregg and Merritt
                undertaken to carry out Sheridan's order, they would have
                encountered this entire corps as it was marching along the
                Shady Grove road.  In fact they would have met the enemy
                before reaching that road, as Hampton was on the Catharpin
                road between Corbin's bridge and Todd's tavern, Wilson did
                move forward to Spottsylvania, where he found Wickham's
                brigade of Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, which he drove from the
                town and held the place for two hours, when he was recalled by
                Sheridan just as Wofford's and Bryan's brigades of Anderson's
                command were moving to attack him: It was not the failure to
                carry out Sheridan's order regarding the bridges, but the
                presence of Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry on the Brock road, that
                prevented the Federals from gaining possession of
                Spottsylvania Court House.  Warren moved at 8:30 p.m. and was
                expected to reach the Court House by daylight on the 8th.  At
                Todd's tavern he was delayed for more than an hour by the
                headquarters escort and 2 miles farther on he encountered the
                enemy's cavalry.  Merritt was directed to move forward and
                clear the road for the infantry.  The Confederates were forced
                back slowly, leaving the road obstructed by fallen trees, so
                that Warren's progress was necessarily slow.  At 6 o'clock in
                the morning Merritt was relieved by Robinson's division, which
                succeeded after a sharp contest in driving the enemy from the
                road, but at this hour Warren's advance was still several
                miles from the Court House.

                     At 8:30 a.m. Robinson came out of the woods into the open
                fields.  Of the Alsop farm, about half way between Todd's
                tavern and Spottsylvania.  Here the Brock road forked, the two
                branches coming together again about a mile farther on.
                Robinson took the left hand road, Denison's brigade on the
                right, Lyle's on the left and Coulter's (formerly Baxter's) on
                the left rear.  Griffin's division moved on the right fork
                with Bartlett's brigade in line of battle in advance, the
                brigades of Ayres and Sweitzer following the road.  Robinson
                reached the junction of the roads before Griffin, formed his
                command in column of regiments and threw out a strong skirmish
                line in front.  Near the intersection of the Brock road and
                the old Court House road the former entered a piece of timber.
                When Robinson's advance was about 300 yards from this timber
                the enemy opened a heavy fire of artillery and musketry upon
                the front and right from a line of intrenchments just inside
                the wood.  Robinson was seriously wounded at the first fire
                and, the national troops were forced back, closely pressed by
                the enemy, who tried to turn Lyle's left, but was prevented
                from doing so by the prompt action of Denison, who placed his
                brigade in the edge of the wood where he checked the further
                advance of the Confederates and finally compelled them to
                retire to their works.  Soon after Robinson's division became
                engaged, Bartlett's line of battle came under the enemy's fire
                when about half-way across the open fields of the Alsop farm.
                At first Bartlett's men gave way, but fortunately just at that
                time Ayres' brigade occupied a sunken part of the road and
                under cover of this position the line was reformed.  Griffin
                then advanced his whole division, Crawford came up with his
                division and drove the enemy from the woods on Griffin's left.
                The Confederate force with which Robinson and Griffin had been
                engaged up to this time was Henagan's and Humphreys' brigades
                of Kershaw's division, which had formed Anderson's advance on
                the Shady Grove road.  When Kershaw reached the Block House
                bridge about daylight he heard the sound of the firing over on
                the Brock road where Fitzhugh Lee was engaged with Merritt
                and Robinson.  Turning sharply to the left with the two
                brigades he reached the woods just as Lee was falling back,
                threw up temporary breastworks and awaited the Federal
                advance.  He was followed a little later by Field's division,
                which came up on Griffin's right about the time that Crawford
                was driving the enemy from the woods.  Cutler's division, the
                last of Warren's corps to arrive, came up in time to prevent
                Field from turning Griffin's flank and drove him from the
                woods after which the entire corps was pushed forward as far
                as possible and intrenched, the 6th corps coming up and
                intrenching on Warren's left.

                     Hancock, who was expected to move with the 2nd corps at
                10 p.m on the 7th, was so delayed by other troops blocking the
                road that he did not begin his march until daylight the next
                morning.  At 9 a.m. the head of his column arrived at Todd's
                tavern, where Gregg's cavalry was found skirmishing with that
                of the enemy.  Hancock threw forward a skirmish line to
                relieve Gregg and then posted his division with Mott covering
                the Brock road to the right, Barlow on Mott's left, Gibbon
                covering the Catharpin road and Birney in reserve.  About 11
                a.m Miles' brigade of Barlow's division, one brigade of
                Gregg's and a battery was sent on a reconnaissance toward
                Corbin's bridge.  When about half a mile from the bridge this
                force was opened upon by the Confederate batteries on the
                hills south of the river.  Miles ordered his artillery to
                reply and formed his infantry in line of battle along a ridge
                in the wood, which position he held until about 5 p.m., when
                he was ordered to return to the tavern.  On the way back he
                was attacked by Mahone's brigade of Hill's corps, which was
                then on the way to Spottsylvania.  Miles repulsed two spirited
                attacks, holding his ground until after dark, when he rejoined
                the division. Gibbon's division was sent to the support of
                Warren and Sedgwick in the afternoon, but the remainder of the
                2nd corps did not move toward Spottsylvania until about noon
                on the 9th.  Then Birney and Barlow moved down the road about
                a mile, where they took a road leading to the right and joined
                Gibbon's division on the high ground overlooking the Po, the
                three divisions going into line of battle facing the river.
                Mott's division was moved from Todd's tavern to the left of
                the 6th corps at Alsop's.  During the day Burnside moved with
                the 9th corps from his position near Chancellorsville down the
                Fredericksburg pike toward Spottsylvania.  On the march
                Willcox's division encountered and repulsed a small force at
                the bridge over the Ny river, after which the command,
                Christ's brigade in advance, pushed on and went into position
                about a mile east of the Court House, where several assaults
                were repulsed during the afternoon, and where the division
                finally intrenched.  The presence of the enemy on the
                Fredericksburg road led Burnside to report to Grant that Lee
                was moving toward Fredericksburg and Hancock was directed to
                force a passage of the Po for the purpose of making a
                reconnaissance on Lee's left.  Although the stream was
                difficult to ford and the opposite bank was held by the enemy,
                each of his three divisions succeeded in crossing and occupied
                the Shady Grove road from Waite's shop, at the cross-roads
                between the Po and Glady run, toward the Block House bridge,
                which Hancock endeavored to seize, but darkness came on before
                the movement could be executed.  That night Hancock threw over
                three pontoon bridges for the passage of his artillery early
                the next morning.

                     Lee became alarmed by Hancock's presence on his left and
                on the evening of the 9th sent Mahone's division to hold the
                Shady Grove road.  Later Mahone was reinforced by Heth's
                division.  As soon as it was light enough to see on the
                morning of the 1Oth, Hancock made a reconnaissance toward the
                Block House bridge with the intention of forcing a passage
                across it, but found the enemy strongly intrenched on the east
                bank.  Concerning his movements in trying to gain possession
                of the bridge he says in his report: "After a careful survey
                had been made, I concluded not to attempt to carry the bridge,
                but sent Brooke's brigade, of Barlow's division down the river
                to ascertain what could be effected there.  Gen. Birney was
                directed to send three or four regiments out on the Andrews'
                tavern road to cover Brooke's movement. Col. Brooke succeeded
                in crossing the river about half way between the bridge and
                the mouth of Glady run. * * * About this time I was informed
                by the major-general commanding, that an assault was to be
                made on the enemy's works on Laurel Hill, in front of Gen.
                Warren's position near Alsop's house.  I was directed to move
                two of my divisions to the left to participate in it, and to
                assume command of the forces to be engaged in the attack."
                Pursuant to this order Gibbon was at once sent to the north
                bank of the Po and formed his command on Warren's right.
                Birney followed, leaving Barlow to hold the ground on the
                south side of the river.  As soon as the enemy discovered that
                the Federals were recrossing the Po, he advanced in force
                against Barlow, who was instructed to fall back across the
                pontoons.  The brigades of Brooke and Brown took up a position
                along a wooded crest about 100 yards in the rear of the works
                Barlow had constructed, while Miles and Smyth were ordered to
                fall back with their brigades to the bank of the river.
                Mistaking the movement of Miles and Smyth for a forced
                retreat, the Confederates advanced in line of battle supported
                by heavy columns and attacked Brooke and Brown, but the
                assault was repulsed.  A second attack was made soon after and
                the combat became close and bloody, but again the enemy was
                forced back.  In the meantime the woods on the right and rear
                of the Union line had caught fire and the flames now came so
                near that it was impossible for Brooke and Brown longer to
                maintain their position.  Taking advantage of the lull that
                followed the second repulse of the enemy the two brigades were
                withdrawn.  This affair is known as the battle of Waite's
                Shop.  Miles' brigade was the last to cross and as he was near
                the river Heth attempted to cross the open ground toward the
                pontoons, but was driven back by the fire of Miles men and the
                batteries on the north bank.

                     All through the forenoon of the 1Oth there were sharp
                skirmishing and artillery firing preparatory to the general
                attack which had been ordered for the afternoon.  Gen.
                Sedgwick had been killed on the 9th and the 6th corps was now
                under command of Brig.-Gen. H. G. Wright.  At 3:45 p.m. he was
                ordered to attack the works in his front with his whole
                command and Mott's division of the 2nd corps.  Warren was also
                ordered to assault the works near the Alsop house with the
                divisions of Crawford and Cutler and the brigades of Webb and
                Carroll of Gibbon's division.  Carroll charged through a belt
                of burning woods, the right of his line gaining the enemy's
                works and the whole brigade pressing up to the abatis, only to
                be forced back by "such a concentrated and murderous fire from
                two lines as to make the position untenable."  Warren was also
                repulsed with heavy loss, Gen. Rice commanding one of Cutler's
                brigades being among the killed.  Col. Emory Upton, with
                twelve regiments of the 6th corps, gained the parapet and
                engaged in some desperate hand-to-hand fighting, capturing
                several pieces of artillery and about 1,000 prisoners.  His
                assault was to have been supported by Mott's division, but
                when Mott reached the open field he was met by an enfilading
                fire from the enemy's batteries, which threw his line into
                confusion and forced him to retire.  The advantage gained by
                Upton was therefore of little moment, for the Confederates
                fairly swarmed against him, compelling him to abandon the
                captured cannon and fall back, though he succeeded in bringing
                in the most of his prisoners.  Altogether the attack was a
                failure.

                     Lee's line extended from the Block House bridge northeast
                across the Brock road to the watershed between the Po and Ny
                rivers, nearly north of the Court House, where it turned
                sharply to the south, the right being near Snell's bridge.
                From his right center the works were thrown forward in a
                horseshoe salient around the crest of a spur between two small
                tributaries of the Ny river.  Ewell's corps occupied the
                salient, Anderson's extended the line to the right and Hill's
                to the left.  Directly. north of the salient, and about three-
                fourths of a mile distant, was the Brown house, while inside
                the enemy's works on the spur within the angle stood the
                McCool house. Very little fighting was done on the 11th, the
                day being spent in preparations for an assault on the salient
                at daylight the next morning.  Mott made an attempt to drive
                in the enemy's skirmishers in order to develop the weak place
                in the Confederate works, but the effort was only partially
                successful.  Wright was instructed to extend his left and
                concentrate on that wing.  Hancock moved his entire corps
                after dark to the vicinity of the Brown house, and was to lead
                the assault.  Warren was to hold the position vacated by the
                2nd corps, and when Hancock began his attack Warren on the
                right and Burnside on the left were to engage the enemy in
                their fronts to prevent reinforcements from being sent to the
                salient.  Hancock was to advance on a line drawn from the
                Brown House to the McCool house.  The night of the 11th was
                dark and stormy, but the troops of the 2nd corps took their
                positions quietly and promptly, fully aware of the desperate
                character of the work awaiting them.  Barlow's division in two
                massed lines was placed on the cleared ground which extended
                up to the enemy's line; Birney's was formed in two deployed
                lines on Barlow's right; Mott's division was in the rear of
                Birney, and Gibbon's was in reserve.  The assault was to have
                been made at 4 o'clock but owing to a dense fog it was 35
                minutes later before Hancock gave the order to advance.  With
                even pace the troops moved forward in column and when about
                half way up the slope broke into a cheer, dashed forward on
                the double-quick through the abatis and over the works.
                Hancock describes the action here as follows: "Barlow's and
                Birney's divisions entered almost at the same moment, striking
                the enemy's line at a sharp salient immediately in front of
                the Landrum house.  A fierce and bloody fight ensued in the
                works with bayonets and clubbed muskets.  It was short,
                however, and resulted in the capture of nearly 4,000 prisoners
                of Johnson's division, of Ewell's corps, 20 pieces of
                artillery, with horses, caissons and material complete,
                several thousand stand of small arms, and upward of 30 colors.
                Among the prisoners were Maj.-Gen. Edward Johnson and Brig.-
                Gen. George H. Steuart, of the Confederate service.  The enemy
                fled in great disorder."

                     So far the assault had been a success.  Elated by their
                victory, the Union troops pursued the flying Confederates
                toward Spottsylvania until they encountered a second line, the
                presence of which was unknown to Hancock or any of his
                officers.  This line was held by Gordon, who checked the rush
                of the Federals and gave Lee an opportunity to push
                reinforcements into the angle.  Lee was further aided at this
                critical moment by the necessity of reforming the Union lines,
                as in the impetuous charge and pursuit practically all
                semblance of a regular formation had been lost.  The divisions
                of Mahone and Wilcox came up from the right and advanced
                against the 2nd corps before the disorder of its success could
                be overcome, driving Hancock's men back to the first line of
                works, where they were reinforced by Wright, with Russell's
                and Wheaton's divisions of the 6th corps( which came up on the
                right and vigorously assaulted the west angle of the salient.
                Again there was some stubborn hand-to-hand fighting in which
                Wright was wounded, though he remained with his men, cheering
                them on, and through the heroic efforts of Upton's brigade the
                line was held against the repeated and determined attempts of
                the Confederates to regain it.  Hancock ordered his artillery
                to the high ground near the Landrum house and throughout the
                day charges of canister were fired over the heads of the Union
                troops into the enemy's line of battle.  On Hancock's left
                Burnside assaulted the Confederate works at 4:30 a.m. and in
                half an hour had carried two lines of rifle-pits.  Stevenson's
                and Potter's divisions then moved against the main line of
                works, a portion of which was carried by Potter, who captured
                a number of prisoners and a battery of 2 guns, but was unable
                to hold his advantage and was finally forced to retire with
                heavy loss.  Several subsequent attacks were made by the two
                divisions, and also by Willcox's on the extreme left, but none
                succeeded in driving the enemy from his position.  The
                persistent hammering of Burnside, however, prevented the enemy
                from withdrawing troops in his front to hurl against Hancock
                and Wright.  About 9 o'clock Warren was directed to attack the
                enemy on his front, but upon attempting to advance his line
                was subjected to a heavy enfilading fire and he was forced
                back.  Cutler's division was then sent to Wright and later the
                whole corps was withdrawn from its position and thrown to the
                left, where it became engaged against the west angle, but
                failed to carry the works.  The firing was so heavy and
                constant that several oak trees inside the salient, some of
                them nearly 2 feet in diameter, were literally gnawed off by
                the bullets.  Late in the day Lee gave up the idea of trying
                to recapture the outer line of works and retired to Gordon's
                line, half a mile to the rear, where he strengthened his
                position during the night.  The losses on both sides were so
                heavy during the action that the salient has passed into
                history as the "Bloody Angle."

End of Report