Battle History
Notwithstanding Lee's order on the evening of the 1st to
"attack the enemy in the morning as early as practicable," the
greater part of the day was spent in maneuvering for position.
Longstreet did not want to attack until the arrival of
Pickett's division. As a matter of fact Pickett did not come
up in time to take any part in the second days, battle, and
Law's brigade of Hood's division did not arrive on the field
until noon on the 2nd. Considerable delay was incurred in
moving the artillery so as to keep out of sight of the Union
signal station on Little Round Top, so that it was the middle
of the afternoon before the Confederates were in position to
begin the general assault on Meade's flanks according to Lee's
plans. This delay cost them dear in the end, as Meade's
different commands were hurrying to the front and when the
attack did come there was an opposition too strong to be
overcome. As soon as possible after his arrival Meade looked
over the ground and at dawn he commenced the formation of his
lines for an attack on the Confederate left. The 12th corps
was sent to the right of Wadsworth on Culp's hill, but Slocum
and Gen. G. K. Warren, who had served as chief engineer under
Hooker, and now held that position on Meade's staff, advised
against such a movement. Meade, however, was determined to
fight aggressively and began to arrange his troops for an
assault on the enemy's left. Some time was necessarily spent
in the preparations and before they were completed Lee
attacked both ends of the Union line, thus forcing Meade to
assume the defensive, which finally proved to be to his
advantage. The Union line was formed as follows: Slocum on
the extreme right; Wadsworth's division on Cemetery hill, with
the other two divisions of the 1st corps at the base;
Hancock's corps, which had come up during the night, next on
the left; then Sickles; Sykes on the extreme left, while
Sedgwick, who had made a march of 35 miles, arriving just
before the attack commenced, was stationed in reserve on the
Taneytown road behind the Round Tops, where he could rest his
men until called on to strengthen some part of the line.
The Confederate line was in the form of a concave.
Longstreet on the left was opposite the Round Tops; Hill in
the center occupied Seminary ridge; Ewell on the right held
the town and the ridges east of Rock creek. Along the north
side of Little Round Top ran a road which crossed the
Emmitsburg road almost at right angles near the center of the
open country lying between the two lines. On the south side
of this road and east of the Emmitsburg road was a large peach
orchard, to the east of which was a Wheatfield. Sickles moved
his corps to the cross roads, forming Humphrey's division
along the Emmitsburg road and Birney's in the peach orchard
and on a ridge south of the cross-road, Ward's brigade being
thrown forward to the Devil's Den. As this position was some
distance in advance of the main line, and subsequently proved
to be untenable, there has been some controversy as to whether
Sickles occupied it by order of the commanding general or
selected it himself. It is not the province of this work,
however, to settle responsibilities, but to tell what
happened. Birney's skirmishers were engaged almost from the
time his line was formed until the main attack of the
Confederates about 4 p.m. When that attack was opened
Longstreet directed a severe artillery fire against the two
sides of the angle formed by Sickles' line, and this was
followed by a fierce assault on Ward, who was overlapped by
the enemy's line and compelled retire. The attack was then
extended toward the peach orchard and some of the enemy's
batteries secured positions from which an enfilading fire was
poured into the two lines forming the angle. Humphreys sent a
brigade and later a regiment to the assistance of Birney, but
soon afterward his own line was vigorously assailed by
Barksdale's brigade on the north and Kershaw's on the west,
making it impossible to render any further aid to Birney, who
was now hard pressed. Graham's brigade was driven from the
orchard, Sickles had lost a leg and Graham was wounded and a
prisoner in the hands of the enemy. The Federal batteries,
commanded by Maj. McGilvery, and which was stationed on the
cross-road below the orchard, met the Confederate advance by
an effective fire, but in vain. One of the batteries was
captured by Kershaw's men, but the 141st Pa. made a gallant
charge and recaptured the guns, bringing them off by hand.
Still the Confederates pressed on, and as a last resort
McGilvery ordered Biglow to sacrifice his battery to save the
rest. With the courage born of desperation he obeyed the
order, fighting until the enemy approached within a few feet,
when he managed to withdraw, but with severe loss. This left
the orchard in the hands of the enemy, which brought them on
Humphreys' flank and Birney's right. Reinforcements were
called for and Hancock sent in Caldwell's division, but it was
compelled to fall back after losing heavily in killed and
wounded, two brigade commanders, Cross and Zook, being among
the killed. Ayres' division next went in, and, although he
struck the enemy on the flank, doubled up their line and
forced them back, he was in the end compelled to make a
hurried retreat to save his command from annihilation.
This fight on the left was a struggle for the possession
of Little Round Top. About the time that Ward was outflanked
Warren rode over to the signal station there to obtain a
better view of what was going on. Seeing the importance of
the position which was then undefended, he assumed the
responsibility of ordering Vincent's brigade of Barnes'
division to occupy the crest, at the same time notifying Meade
of what he had done and asking for a force sufficient to hold
it. As Ward retired the Confederates, made a rush for the
hill, but were met on the top by Vincent's men who repulsed
the first assault with the bayonet. The 140th N. Y.,
belonging to Weed's brigade of Barnes' division, and Hazlett's
battery were then sent to the aid of Vincent. Having failed
in the first attempt to carry the position, the enemy next
made an effort to turn the left, but were met by the 2Oth Me.,
under Col. Chamberlain. At first the Unionists were forced
back by the main strength of superior numbers, but Svkes
hurried a brigade to the relief of Chamberlain, and a brigade
of the Pennsylvania reserves arriving about the same time, the
Confederates were driven from the hill with a loss of 500
captured and 1,000 stands of arms taken, besides a large
number in killed and wounded. After the 3rd corps had been
driven from the peach orchard the enemy began to form in front
of the wheatfield for another assault on Little Round Top.
McCandless' brigade of Crawford's division, led by Crawford
himself, charged and drove them to the farther side of the
wheatfield, where they found shelter behind a stone fence. In
the meantime two brigades-Eustis' and Nevin's-of Sedgwick's
corps had come forward and during the time of Crawford's
charge took a position in front of the ridge. The sight of
these fresh troops had a discouraging effect on the
Confederates and they withdrew from the contest.
Through some miscalculation Ewell did not begin his
attack on the Federal right until after Longstreet's repulse.
The plan of attack here was for Johnson to move against Culp's
hill, and as soon as he was fairly engaged Early and Rodes
were to assault the works on Cemetery hill. When the fight
commenced on the left Ewell opened with his artillery and kept
up the fire for about an hour before making any further
movement against the Union lines. In this time Meade, under
the impression that the demonstration on his right was merely
a feint, withdrew from that portion of his line all of the
12th corps except Greene's brigade, and sent it to the support
of Sykes. About 5 p.m. Johnson crossed Rock creek and
advanced against Greene and Wadsworth. Greene held out until
he was reinforced, when the enemy was driven from his front,
though Johnson occupied the entrenchments that had been
abandoned by the 12th corps, giving him a strong position on
the right flank of the Union army. While this was taking
place Early sent the brigades of Hays and Hoke, the latter
commanded by Col. Avery, up the valley between Culp's and
Cemetery hills to assault the Federal position on the latter.
The advance was somewhat impetuous driving back Von Gilsa's
and Ames' brigades, which were stationed at the foot of the
hill. In the rear of this infantry line were Wiedrich's and
Ricketts' batteries, which were next attacked, the former
being captured and 2 guns of the latter spiked. Farther up
the hill were the batteries of Stevens, Reynolds and Stewart,
the officers of which had orders from Col. Wainright to "fight
the guns to the last." As the enemy advanced in the face of
these guns they were met by a storm of canister Stevens'
battery especially doing effective work. Hancock voluntarily
sent Carroll's brigade to the support of the batteries, which
were also reinforced by the 106th Pa. and a detachment from
Schurz' command. The arrival of these troops carried dismay
into the enemy's lines, which had not been properly supported,
although Gordon's brigade had been assigned to that duty, and
a retreat was ordered. As they fell back they were followed
by a shower of canister from the batteries, which killed and
wounded a large number and threw the line into some confusion.
It is said that the Confederate organization known as the
"Louisiana Tigers," went into this fight with 1,750 men, of
whom only 150 returned unscathed. Rodes was delayed in making
his attack, having to move out of Gettysburg by the flank,
then change front and march some distance. By the time he was
in position to cooperate with Early the latter had met defeat.
The day closed with the Union forces still in possession of
the ridge, though the enemy had gained some advantage on the
right, as Johnson still held the entrenchments of the 12th
corps, which threatened the safety of Meade's army by cutting
off the line of retreat if such a movement became necessary.
This victory, meager as it was, offered Lee sufficient
incentive to continue the contest the next morning. That
night a council of war was held, at which it was unanimously
decided to "stay and fight it out." It is said that Meade was
somewhat displeased at the decision, because he wanted to
retire to the ground previously selected at Pipe creek.
However this may have been he acquiesced in the judgment of
his corps commanders, and preparations were immediately
commenced looking to the coming engagement.
Lee's general plan of battle for the 3rd was similar to
that of the preceding day. Ewell was to open the fight by
pressing the advantage already gained on the extreme right,
and after his attack was well under way the main assault was
to be made on the center. Johnson was reinforced by three
brigades and instructed to begin his attack at daybreak. But
a disagreeable surprise was in store for him. Geary returned
to Culp's hill about midnight and learned that his
entrenchments were in the hands of the enemy. He took a
position with Greene and began making arrangements to recover
his works at the earliest opportunity the next morning.
Batteries were brought up during the remaining hours of
darkness and stationed at all the points bearing on Johnson,
and as soon as it was light enough to distinguish objects the
guns opened fire. Johnson was without artillery, so he
determined to risk all on a charge. The charge was gallantly
made, but it was bravely met by Kane's brigade of Geary's
division, and a severe contest was waged for several hours.
Williams' division, now commanded by Col. Thomas H. Ruger,
came up and gained a position where it could strike Johnson on
the flank, and about the same time Shaler's brigade of
Newton's division joined Kane, when Johnson, finding the
conflict an unequal one, withdrew to Rock creek, leaving Geary
and Ruger in possession of their old line. This part of the
third day's battle was ended long before Lee's troops were in
position to assault Cemetery hill, and again that concert of
action, so essential to Confederate success, was lost.
Pickett's division, which had not yet been engaged, was
selected to lead the charge against the Union center.
Longstreet, in his report, thus describes the arrangement of
troops and plan of the assault: "Orders were given to Maj.-
Gen. Pickett to form his line under the best cover that he
could get from the enemy's batteries, and so that the center
of the assaulting column would arrive at the salient of the
enemy's position, Gen. Pickett's line to be the guide and to
attack the enemy's defenses, and Gen. Pettigrew, in command of
Heth's division, moving on the same line as Gen. Pickett, was
to assault the salient at the same moment. Pickett's division
was arranged, two brigades in the front line, supported by his
third brigade, and Wilcox's brigade was ordered to move in
rear of his right flank, to protect it from any force that the
enemy might attempt to move against it. Heth's division, under
command of Brig.-Gen. Pettigrew was arranged in two lines, and
these supported by part of Maj.-Gen. Pender's division, under
Maj.-Gen. Trimble. All of the batteries of the 1st and 3rd
corps, and some of those of the 2nd, were put into the best
positions for effective fire upon the point of attack and the
hill occupied by the enemy's left. Col. Walton, chief of
artillery of the 1st corps, and Col. Alexander had posted our
batteries and agreed with the artillery officers of the other
corps upon a signal for the batteries to open." At 1 p.m. two
cannon shots were heard in quick succession. This was the
signal for the Confederate batteries to open fire, and
immediately 150 guns commenced their deadly work. The object
was to silence the Union guns, and when this was accomplished
Pickett was to move forward to the grand assault which was to
decide the fate of the battle. Owing to the convex form of
the Federal position only 80 guns could find room on the ridge
to respond to the enemy's fire. That number was already in
position and for two hours was waged an artillery duel seldom
if ever equaled in the annals of wars. The enemy's fire was
very effective, although many of the shells went high and
exploded in the open ground to the rear of the ridge, forcing
the artillery reserve to move to a better protected position
Meade was compelled to change the location of his
headquarters, a number of guns were disabled, though they were
quickly replaced by others brought up from the reserve, about
a dozen caissons were blown up and after each of these
explosions the exultant yells of the Confederates could be
heard along their entire line. During this time Pickett's men
were in the wood on Seminary ridge, waiting for the command to
move forward across the 1,400 yards of open ground in their
endeavor to pierce the Union center. The Union generals knew
that this fierce artillery fire was but the prelude to a
charge and placed their commands in position to receive the
shock. About 3 o'clock Hunt ordered the guns to cease firing,
partly to replenish his supply of ammunition, and partly to
see what the enemy would do. Thinking that the batteries were
silenced Pickett emerged from the woods and began his advance,
his men marching with such even step that for a little while
the whole Union line stood in silent admiration of this
display of heroism on the part of men who were marching to
certain death. But when about half of the open space had been
crossed the Federal batteries again opened with telling
effect. Great gaps were torn in Pickett's line by the shot
and shell, but they were quickly closed up as the line pressed
forward. When the Confederates crossed the Emmitsburg road
canister came into use, and at the same time McGilvery's guns
on Little Round Top opened a destructive, enfilading fire on
the advancing lines. Still on they came. Hancock's
skirmishers near the Emmitsburg road were driven back like
chaff before the wind. The enemy had now come within musket
range and Hays' division poured volley after volley into the
left, causing it to waver so that it fell behind the main
column. Before Pickett's first line reached the stone wall,
behind which the main line of Meade's army was posted,
Stannard found an opportunity to make a flank attack with his
Vermont brigade. Quickly changing front with two of his three
regiments, he brought them perpendicular to the enemy's line
and sent in a volley that forced Kemper's brigade staggering
back on the center. This was closely followed up by Col.
Gates, of the 20th N. Y. militia, throwing Pickett's left into
confusion and causing many to surrender, while others threw
away their arms and took to their heels.
Although the two ends of the line were badly disorganized
by these flank attacks, the center kept bravely on to the
stone wall. Gen. Armistead, whose brigade was in this portion
of the line, was one of the first to gain the wall. Placing
his hat on the point of his sword he waved it above his head
and shouted: "Give,em the cold steel, boys!" His example was
speedily followed and with fixed bayonets the Confederates
came pouring over the wall. One of the batteries was
captured, the enemy's flag floated for a few brief moments
over the Federal works, while the "rebel yell" resounded on
all sides. But their triumph was of short duration. The
place where the Union line was broken was directly in front of
Webb's brigade of Gibbon's division. Webb rallied the 72nd
Pa. and led it against the enemy; part of the 71st Pa. gained
a position behind a stone wall on the right, from which they
poured a murderous fire into Armistead's flank. The remainder
of this regiment and the 68th Pa. found shelter in a clump of
trees and sent a storm of leaden hail into the ranks of the
assailants. Col. Hall, commanding Gibbon's 3rd brigade, made a
dashing charge with two regiments of his own command, the 15th
Mass., the 1st Minn., and the 19th Me. of the 1st brigade,
that drove the enemy from the works and turned defeat into
victory. Back across the open space, over which they had
marched with heroic determination but a short time before, the
Confederates now fled in the wildest disorder. Of Pickett's
three brigade commanders Armistead and Garnett were killed and
Kemper severely wounded. Nearly three-fourths of his command
were either killed, wounded or captured. As the enemy
retreated, Stannard, who had held his position during the
action, repeated his flank movement and captured a large part
of Wilcox's brigade, which was coming up to Pickett's support.
Lee's grand coup de main had failed.
While the main battle was in progress in the center there
were sharp cavalry engagements on both flanks. On the left
part of Kilpatrick's division made a charge through the woods
near Devil's Den, against the infantry and artillery stationed
there. In this action Kilpatrick lost a number in killed and
wounded, among the former being Gen. Farnsworth. The affair
on the right was of greater magnitude. Four of Stuart's
brigades were ordered to cover Ewell's left, and to make a
demonstration to divert attention from the main attack. Then,
if Pickett's charge proved successful, he was to fall on the
rear of the Federals or harass their retreat. Stuart planted
several batteries on the hills commanding the Baltimore pike
and made other preparations to attack the minute he heard that
Pickett had carried the works on Cemetery hill. Custer's
brigade of Kilpatrick's division became engaged, although he
was under orders to join his command on the left, and
continued the fight until he was relieved by McIntosh's
brigade of Gregg's division. One of Stuart's batteries was
posted near the buildings of the Rummel farm and Mclntosh
undertook to drive it away. He soon encountered a strong body
of skirmishers and sent back for reinforcements. Randol's and
Pennington's batteries were moved to the front and soon
silenced the enemy's batteries, when McIntosh moved up and
occupied the position. W. H. Lee's brigade now came up to the
support of the skirmish line and succeeded in repulsing the
1st N. J., whose ammunition was exhausted. The 7th Mich. was
also driven back and it began to look dark for McIntosh, when
the 5th Mich. made a charge on Lee and soon had him on the
retreat. Just then Hampton's brigade, which had been kept in
reserve by Stuart, came up and again turned the tide in favor
of the Confederates. Although Custer had been relieved he had
not yet left the field. Seeing the Union troops about to be
overpowered he placed himself at the head of the 1st Michigan
and shouting "Come on, you Wolverines!" charged with such
impetuosity that Hampton's line was temporarily thrown into
confusion. Custer's timely action put new courage into those
already engaged, and for a few minutes every saber was busy
officers and privates fighting side by side. Capt. Hart next
brought up a squadron of the 1st N. J. and the Confederates
gave way.
Beaten at every point the Confederates fell back to a
strong position on Seminary ridge, where the army lay all day
on the 4th anxiously expecting and dreading an attack from
Meade, who was content to hold his position on Cemetery ridge.
Some skirmishing occurred during the day and that night Lee's
army, broken and dispirited, began its retreat into Virginia.
The decisive battle of the Civil war had been fought and won
by the Federals and the days of the Confederacy were numbered.
The Union losses at Gettysburg were 3,155 killed, 14,529
wounded and 5,365 missing. The Confederate reports give Lee's
losses as being 2,592 killed, 12,709 wounded and 5,150
missing, but the records of prisoners of war in the office of
the adjutant-general of the United States army bear the names
of 12,277 Confederates who were captured at the battle of
Gettysburg.
Source: The Union Army, vol. 5
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