Battle History
Battle History
GETTYSBURG, PA.
JULY 1ST - 3RD, 1863
Gettysburg, Pa., July 1-3, 1863. Army of the Potomac.
After the battles of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville the
opinion became prevalent through the South that Lee's Army of
Northern Virginia was more than a match for the Federal Army
of the Potomac, and a clamor arose for an aggressive movement.
There were at this time potent reasons why Lee should assume
the offensive. An invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania would
have a tendency to draw troops from Grant at Vicksburg and
Rosecrans in Tennessee to repel the invaders, thus relieving
the pressure on the Confederate forces under Pemberton,
Johnston and Bragg. If the invasion should prove to be
successful European nations might be persuaded to recognize
the Confederacy, loans could be obtained and probably aid
secured to open the Southern ports, then in a state of
blockade. All these reasons and possibilities were carefully
weighed and toward the last of May Lee decided to make the
invasion. Since the battle of Chancellorsville he had been
lying at Fredericksburg, recruiting and reorganizing his army,
which on June 1, numbered, according to Confederate reports,
88,754 men. It was divided into three corps, as follows: The
1st, commanded by Lieut.-Gen. James Longstreet, was composed
of the divisions of McLaws, Pickett and Hood, and the reserve
artillery under Col. J. B. Walton. The 2nd, under the command
of Lieut.-Gen. Richard S. Ewell, included the divisions of
Early, Johnson and Rodes, the reserve artillery being in
charge of Col. J. T. Brown. The 3rd, commanded by Lieut.-Gen.
Ambrose P. Hill consisted of the divisions of Anderson, Heth
and Pender, and the reserve artillery under Col. R. L. Walker.
In addition to these three corps was the cavalry under the
command of Maj.- Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, and consisting of the
brigades of Fitzhugh Lee, W. H. F. Lee, Hampton, Jenkins, W.
E. Jones and Imboden, and six batteries of horse artillery
under the command of Maj. R. F. Beckham.
Having decided to undertake an offensive movement, Lee
chose a route along the eastern base of the Blue Ridge, from
which he could at any time threaten Washington or Baltimore,
hoping by this means to detain the Union army in a position to
defend the national capital, or failing in that to draw it
after him and into a general engagement on a field of his own
selection. He accordingly began the concentration of his army
at Culpeper leaving Hill at Fredericksburg to keep up a show
of force there in order to keep Hooker from ascertaining what
was going on until it was too late for him to interfere.
Through the medium of dispatches captured in the affair at
Brandy Station on June 9, Hooker learned that the major part
of Lee's army was at Culpeper. He proposed to cross over the
river and attack Hill, but the movement was forbidden by Gen.
Halleck. He then suggested a movement against Richmond to
force Lee to recall his army in that direction, but this, too,
was forbidden, though either might have been successful.
Hooker then sent the 3rd and 5th corps to guard the fords on
the Rappahannock, to prevent the Confederates from crossing,
and on the night of the 13th, moved his forces northward to
Manassas Junction and Thoroughfare gap. This compelled Lee to
change his plans and select the longer route through the
Shenandoah Valley. The Federal force at Winchester, commanded
by Gen. Milroy, was driven out on the 15th, Ewell pursuing
across the Potomac and occupying Hagerstown and Sharpsburg.
About the same time the Union troops at Harper's Ferry and
Martinsburg were withdrawn to Maryland heights, thus leaving
the valley open to Lee, who crossed the Potomac at
Williamsport and Shepherdstown on the 24th and 25th, united
his columns at Hagerstown, and pushed on toward Chambersburg,
Pa. On the 25th and 26th, Hooker crossed the Potomac at
Edwards' ferry and the next day Reynolds, with three corps,
occupied the passes of South mountain, thus forestalling any
attempt of Lee to pass to the eastward. To cut the enemy's
communications with Virginia, Hooker ordered the 12th corps,
then near Harper's Ferry, to march to that place, where it
would be joined by the forces under Gen. Kelley on Maryland
heights, and then, in connection with Reynolds, operate on
Lee's rear. Again Halleck interposed an objection, deeming it
inadvisable to abandon Harper's Ferry, and Hooker asked to be
relieved from command of the army. He was succeeded by Maj.-
Gen. George G. Meade on June 28. The Army of the Potomac was
then organized as follows: Maj.-Gen. John F. Reynolds,
formerly commanding the 1st corps, was placed in command of
the left wing, Maj.-Gen. Abner Doubleday taking command of the
corps, which consisted of three divisions under Brig.-Gen.
James S. Wadsworth, John C. Robinson and Thomas A. Rowley, and
the artillery brigade commanded by Col. Charles S. Wainright.
The 2nd corps, commanded by Maj.-Gen. Winfield S. Hancock,
embraced the three divisions under Brig.-Gen. John C.
Caldwell, John Gibbon and Alexander Hays, and the artillery
brigade of Capt. John G. Hazard. The 3rd corps, Maj.-Gen.
Daniel E. Sickles, was made up of the divisions of Maj.-Gen.
David B. Birney and Brig.-Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys, and the
artillery brigade commanded by Capt. George E. Randolph. The
5th corps, Maj.-Gen. George Sykes, was composed of the three
divisions of Brig.-Gen. James Barnes, Romeyn B. Ayres and
Samuel W. Crawford, and the artillery brigade of Capt. A. P.
Martin. The 6th corps, Maj.-Gen. John Sedgwick, embraced the
divisions of Brig.-Gen. Horatio G. Wright, Brig.-Gen. Albion
P. Howe and Maj.-Gen. John Newton, and the artillery brigade
of Col. Charles H. Tompkins. The 11th corps, Maj.-Gen. Oliver
O. Howard, included the divisions of Brig.-Gen. Francis C.
Barlow and Adolph von Steinwehr, Maj.-Gen. Carl Schurz, and
the artillery brigade commanded by Maj. Thomas W. Osborn. The
12th corps, Maj.-Gen. Henry W. Slocum was composed of the two
divisions of Brig.-Gen. Alpheus S. Williams and John W.
Geary, and the artillery brigade under command of Lieut. E. D.
Muhlenberg. The cavalry corps, Maj.-Gen. Alfred Pleasonton,
included the three divisions commanded by Brig.-Gen. John
Buford, David McM. Gregg and Judson Kilpatrick, and the horse
artillery under Capt. James M. Robertson. Altogether the army
had 65 batteries numbering 370 guns. Of these 212 were with
the infantry, 50 with the cavalry, and an artillery reserve of
108 under the command of Brig-Gen. Robert O. Tyler, Brig.-Gen.
Henry J. Hunt being the chief of artillery. Meade took
command in the midst of a campaign, and when the army was
preparing to move through a region with which he was but
little acquainted. For the time he decided to follow Hooker's
plans, the only departure there from being to recall Slocum's
corps from the Confederate rear, with orders to join the main
column. Without consulting Halleck he ordered the troops at
Maryland heights, now under the command of Gen. French, to
move up to Frederick, where they were to act as a reserve when
the army moved forward. Such information as he could obtain
regarding the enemy's movements located Longstreet at
Chambersburg, Ewell at Carlisle and York, where he was
preparing to attack Harrisburg, and Hill in the vicinity of
Cashtown. Conjecturing that Harrisburg was Lee's objective
point, Meade determined to move directly toward that place and
if possible strike the enemy before he could cross the
Susquehanna. Orders to that effect were issued to the various
corps commanders on the evening of the 28th and early the next
morning the army was in motion.
Stuart's cavalry had been sent on a raid around the Union
army, in the hope that by threatening its rear he could delay
the crossing of the Potomac until Lee could capture
Harrisburg. But he encountered Federal troops in so many
unexpected places that his raid was prolonged to such an
extent he did not arrive at Gettysburg until the battle was
almost over. Being thus deprived of his cavalry, Lee had no
way of obtaining information of the movements of the Federals,
and up to the 28th, supposed them to be still on the south side
of the Potomac. On the afternoon of that day he ordered Hill
and Longstreet to join Ewell for an advance on Harrisburg.
Late that night a scout came to Lee's headquarters with the
information that Hooker had been superseded by Meade, that the
Union army was north of the Potomac and in a position to
seriously menace the Confederate line of communications.
These tidings changed the whole situation. In his report Lee
says: "In the absence of the cavalry, it was impossible to
ascertain his intentions, but to deter him from advancing
farther west, and intercepting our communication with
Virginia, it was determined to concentrate the army east of
the mountains." Instructions were hurried to Hill and
Longstreet to move to Cashtown, 8 miles northwest of
Gettysburg, Ewell was recalled from Carlisle, and Pickett was
left at Chambersburg to guard the rear until relieved by
Imboden. Owing to rainy weather these movements were
performed somewhat leisurely, but Heth's division reached
Cashtown on the afternoon of the 29th. That evening the Union
army was in position just south of the state line, with the
right at New Windsor and the left at Emmitsburg. Buford's
cavalry division was on the extreme left, with his advance
well toward Gettysburg. Buford sent Merritt's brigade to
Mechanicstown to guard the trains and issued orders for
Gamble's and Devin's brigades to move early on the following
morning to Gettysburg, where he expected to find some of
Kilpatrick's cavalry. The two brigades entered the town about
noon, and found a detachment of the enemy within half a mile
of the place. This was Pettigrew's brigade of Heth's
division, which had been sent from Cashtown to procure
supplies, but finding the town in possession of the Union
forces hurriedly fell back on the main body of the division.
Scouting parties were sent out in all directions, bringing in
information showing that the Confederates were unquestionably
aiming to concentrate in the vicinity of Gettysburg, and
Buford so notified Meade that evening. Pickets were thrown
out toward Cashtown and Hunterstown, and the ridges west of
the town occupied in anticipation of an attack the next day.
Meade's chief objects had been to force Lee to forego his
intention of crossing the Susquehanna, and to bring on an
engagement at the first opportunity. The field selected for
such an engagement was along the banks of Pipe creek, a little
stream 15 miles south of Gettysburg. With a view to meeting
Lee at this point the different commands were so placed as to
be easily concentrated along Pipe creek, while at the same
time they were held in readiness to move elsewhere as the
occasion might demand. On the evening of June 30, the 1st
corps was at Marsh creek, about halfway between Emmitsburg and
Gettysburg; the 2nd and 3rd were in the vicinity of Taneytown,
the 5th was at Union Mills, southeast of Taneytown, the 6th
was at Manchester, still farther east; the 11th was near
Emmitsburg, Kilpatrick's cavalry was at Hanover, and Gregg's
at Westminster. The information received from Buford caused a
change in Meade's plans. Reynolds was ordered to move the
1st, 3rd and 11th corps to the support of Buford, Sickles
relieving the last at Emmitsburg, and the other corps
commanders instructed to move toward Gettysburg.
The town of Gettysburg is located about 7 miles from the
Maryland line, and some 10 miles east of South mountain. It
is in a valley, surrounded by broken granite ridges. On one
of these, about half a mile west of the town, stood the
Lutheran seminary, the elevation being known as Seminary
ridge. It was covered with an open woods and at the north end
is a knoll called Oak hill. South is a chain of hills
beginning about 3 miles from town and running almost due north
for a distance of 2 miles when it makes a curve to the east.
At the south end of this chain is Round Top, just east of this
is a smaller hill called Little Round Top; at the curve is
Cemetery hill, while at the eastern extremity of the range is
Culp's hill. About 500 yards west of Little Round Top, in the
forks of Plum creek is a hill known as the Devil's Den. It is
steep and rocky on the eastern side sloping away gradually to
the west and is about 100 lower than Little Round Top. The
summits of nearly all the ridges were covered with huge
boulders, forming a natural protection to sharpshooters, etc.
Near the western base of Cemetery hill was Ziegler's grove,
and along the base of the ridge farther south were the Weikert
and Trostle houses. Roads enter the town from almost every
direction. Through the valley between the Round Tops and
Seminary ridge ran the Emmitsburg road; along the eastern side
of the ridge was the road to Taneytown, running southeast,
between Cemetery and Culp's hills, was the Baltimore pike.
These three roads came together near the cemetery and entered
the town from the south. The Fairfield and Chambersburg roads
diverged at the west side of town, the former running
southwest and the latter northwest over Seminary ridge. From
the north came the Harrisburg, Carlisle and Middletown roads,
and Black's turnpike, while the Oxford and Bonaughton roads
entered the town from the east. On the east side of town is
Rock creek and west of Seminary ridge is Willoughby run, both
flowing southward.
At daybreak on July 1, Buford held the roads and ridges
to the west of Gettysburg with Devin's and Gamble's brigades,
his vedettes being thrown out far enough to give timely
warning of the enemy's approach. About 8 a.m. the scouts
reported the enemy advancing in force from the direction of
Cashtown. This was Heth's entire division, which had been
sent forward to occupy Gettysburg. Gamble's brigade was
formed on the left from the Fairfield road to the railroad
cut, with one section of Calef's battery near the left and the
rest of it on the Chambersburg pike. Devin formed on the
right, extending the line to Oak hill, a portion of the men
being dismounted and thrown forward as skirmishers. Heth
advanced on the Chambersburg road, with Archer's brigade to
the right and Davis, to the left of the pike, and the brigades
of Pettigrew and Brockenbrough in support. About 9 o'clock
Buford had three cannon shots fired as a signal for his
skirmishers to open fire on the advancing Confederates, and
the battle of Gettysburg was begun. Buford had been notified
that Reynolds was coming to his support and determined to hold
his ground until the reinforcements arrived. When the sound
of the firing reached Reynolds his advance, Wadsworth's
division, was within a mile of the town. This command was
hurried forward across the fields, Reynolds riding ahead to
Seminary ridge, where he met Buford and learned the positions
of the contending forces. As soon as Wadsworth arrived three
regiments of Cutler's brigade were formed north of the
railroad cut and the other two south of the pike, Hall's
battery relieving Calef's, which had almost exhausted its
supply of ammunition. Meredith's "Iron Brigade" was sent
against Archer on the left, and Devin's brigade of cavalry was
faced north to meet Ewell, who was known to be coming up from
Heidlersburg. Cutler's line had barely been formed when it
was struck on the front and right by Davis. Col. Fowler who
was in command of the two regiments south of the road, changed
front, drove Davis from the field, and took possession of the
railroad cut, capturing the two regiments which occupied it.
Reynolds sent word to Howard to hurry forward the 11th corps,
and then rode over to where Meredith and Archer were
contending for a piece of timber, known as McPherson's woods,
on the east side of Willoughby run. While directing the
movements of this brigade Reynolds was killed by a shot from a
Confederate sharpshooter, and Meredith was wounded by the
explosion of a shell in front of his horse. Col. Morrow, of
the 24th Mich., then took command, charged into the woods,
captured Archer and about 800 of his men, and forced the rest
to retire across the creek. By this time all of the 1st corps
was on the field. Stone's brigade of Rowley's division was
sent to the left of the pike, where it drove out the enemy's
skirmishers and took position behind a ridge, being partly
sheltered by a stone fence. Biddle's brigade was posted on
the left of McPherson's wood, with Cooper's battery on the
right, while Robinson's division was stationed in reserve on
Seminary ridge. Reynolds' battery relieved Hall's and Calef's
again joined Gamble's cavalry, which was also in reserve.
The enemy had also received heavy reinforcements,
Pender's division coming up from Cashtown and Ewell's corps
from Carlisle. Heth reformed his division south of the
Chambersburg road, with Pender in support, and nine batteries
stationed on commanding points west of Willoughby run. Lee
had notified Ewell not to bring on a general engagement until
the entire army was brought up, but on arriving on the field
and finding Hill's corps already engaged he ordered Rodes'
division to take position on Seminary ridge and Carter's
battalion of artillery to occupy Oak hill. It was now nearly
2 p.m., when the batteries on Oak hill opened upon the Union
lines an enfilading fire that forced Wadsworth to retire
Cutler to Seminary ridge, where he was joined by Robinson's
whole division to resist the advance of Rodes, who was
following along the ridge with O'Neal's and Doles' brigades on
the eastern slope and Iverson's, Daniel's and Ramseur's on the
western. At 2:30 Rodes gave the order to attack. Iverson was
confronted by Paul's brigade and O'Neal by Baxter's. O'Neal
was soon repulsed and Baxter went to the assistance of Paul.
At the same time Cutler swung his line around so as to attack
Iverson on the right flank. Baxter's men from the shelter of
a stone fence fired a volley at short range into the
Confederate ranks, leaving 500 of Iverson's command dead and
wounded on the field, and the rest surrendered. About 1,000
prisoners and 3 regimental colors were taken in this part of
the engagement. Howard had arrived with the 11th corps about
noon and assumed command. Shurz took command of the corps and
Brig.-Gen. Alexander Schimmelfennig of the 3rd division. This
division and Barlow's were thrown forward on the right to
check Ewell's advance, leaving Steinwehr's, with two
batteries, as a reserve and rallying point on Cemetery hill.
Upon hearing of the death of Reynolds Meade ordered
Hancock to proceed from Taneytown to Gettysburg and assume
command of the left wing. Hancock arrived about 3 p.m. and
found the Union troops retiring before the vastly superior
numbers of the enemy. Early's division had secured a position
on the flank and rear of the 11th corps, the artillery on the
hills east of Rock creek enfilading its entire line. Up to
this time the assaults of the enemy had been made without
concert at various points along the line, giving the Federals
an opportunity to repulse one before the next was commenced.
But about 4 o'clock the whole Confederate line advanced-50,000
against probably 15,000. The odds were too great and orders
were issued to fall back to Cemetery hill. The men retired in
good order, fighting as they went, the only confusion being
that which resulted by crowding the narrow streets of the
town. Wadsworth's division was sent to occupy Culp's hill and
skirmishers were thrown forward to the west side of the town
to hold the Confederates in check until the new line of battle
could be formed. About 5 o'clock Williams' division of the
12th corps came up and was stationed on the right and rear of
Wadsworth. Geary's division arrived soon afterward and was
sent to occupy Little Round Top and the ridge running toward
Cemetery hill, in a position commanding the Emmitsburg and
Taneytown roads. Stannard's brigade of Rowley's division also
came up and joined the command, but too late to participate in
the fight. These reinforcements greatly encouraged those who
had borne the brunt of the battle all day, and the trains were
sent to the rear out of the way to prepare for the action
which was to come on the morrow. As the day drew to a close
and it became evident that the enemy did not intend to renew
the attack, Hancock turned over the command to Slocum and set
out for Meade's headquarters at Taneytown. Orders were given
for all the different commands to march at once to Gettysburg,
Meade set out for the scene of action, and about 1 a.m. on the
2nd reached the field.
End of Report
<tlconner@evansville.net>
Last Modified: Sunday, July 19 1998