Battle History
FREDERICKSBURG, VA.
DEC. 13TH, 1862
Fredericksburg, Va., Dec. 13, 1862. Army of the Potomac
After the battle of Antietam, on Sept. 17, both the Union and
Confederate armies remained inactive for nearly two months.
Lee retired to Bunker Hill and Winchester, Va., where he
undertook the work of recruiting and reorganizing his
shattered army. McClellan was engaged during this time in
guarding the line of the Potomac, to prevent another attempt
on the part of the Confederates to move northward, and in
reorganizing and equipping his forces. On Nov. 7, he was
relieved of the command of the Army of the Potomac and Maj.-
Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside appointed to succeed him. One of,
the first acts of the new commander was to organize the army
into three grand divisions. The Right grand division,
commanded by Maj.-Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, consisted of the 2nd
and 9th corps, the former commanded by Maj.-Gen. Darius N.
Couch and the latter by Brig.-Gen. Orlando B. Willcox, and the
cavalry division of two brigades, under the command of Brig.-
Gen. Alfred Pleasonton. The Center grand division was
commanded by Maj.-Gen. Joseph Hooker and was made up of the
3rd and 5th corps and the cavalry division of Brig.-Gen. W. W.
Averell. The 3rd corps was commanded by Brig.-Gen. George
Stoneman and the 5th by Brig.-Gen. Daniel Butterfield. The
Left grand division, commanded by Maj.-Gen. William B.
Franklin, consisted of the 1st corps, commanded by Maj.-Gen.
John F. Reynolds, the 6th corps, Maj.-Gen. William F. Smith,
and the cavalry division commanded by Brig.-Gen. George D.
Bayard. With the army were about 70 field batteries, the
entire army numbering, according to Burnside's report for Dec.
10, 116,683 men. Lee's army now numbered about 78,500 men and
was divided into two corps. The 1st, commanded by Lieut.-Gen.
James Longstreet was composed of the divisions of McLaws,
Anderson, Pickett, Hood and Ransom, and the 2nd corps, under
the command of Lieut.-Gen. Thomas J. Jackson, consisted of the
divisions of D. H. and A. P. Hill, Ewell, and Jackson's old
division, now commanded by Gen. W. B. Taliaferro.
Burnside's plan was to establish a base of supplies on
the Potomac, at or near Acquia creek, and then move against
Richmond by the way of Fredericksburg. In telegraphing the
president's acceptance of this plan Gen. Halleck added: "He
thinks it will succeed if you move rapidly; otherwise not."
This telegram was received by Burnside at his headquarters at
Warrenton, Va., a little while before noon on Nov. 14. The
war department promised to send a sufficient number of
pontoons to Fredericksburg to enable the army to cross the
Rappahannock, and early on the 15th, the army was put in motion
for Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg, Sumner's command
forming the advance. Sumner reached Falmouth on the I7th,
and the rest of the army two days later. At that time there
was only a small Confederate force at Fredericksburg, and the
intention was that Sumner should cross the river and take
possession of the heights back of the town before Lee could
reinforce the garrison. But the promised pontoons had not
arrived, the river could not be forded by a large army, and
the railroad and turnpike bridges had been destroyed by the
enemy. There was nothing to do but wait. Hooker and Sumner
both wanted to cross the river at some point above or below
the town, but Burnside deemed it inexpedient to hazard such a
movement, until the entire army was ready. The pontoons did
not arrive until the 25th, and several days more elapsed before
they could be placed in position. Any one familiar with the
military character of Lee can readily imagine that he was not
idle during this period. The day that Sumner reached Falmouth
the Federal plan was made apparent to the Confederate
commander, who immediately ordered McLaws' and Ransom's
divisions to Fredericksburg. On the 19th the rest of
Longstreet's corps was ordered up and on the 26th, Jackson,
whose command was then in the vicinity of Orange Court House,
was directed to join Longstreet. The river for some distance
above and below the town was guarded by cavalry, D. H. Hill
was sent to Port Royal, a few miles further down, to prevent
the Federal gunboats from landing supplies there, and by the
time that Burnside was ready to cross Lee's whole force was
entrenched on the heights in the rear of Fredericksburg, his
lines extending from about a mile and a half above the town to
the Richmond railroad below. In his report Burnside says: "By
this time (Nov. 25) the enemy had concentrated a large force
on the opposite side of the river, so that it became necessary
to make arrangements to cross in the face of a vigilant and
formidable foe. These arrangements were not completed until
about Dec. 10.'
Fredericksburg lies on the right bank of the Rappahannock
in a bend, the general course of the river at this point being
southeast. The heights on the Fredericksburg side approach
near the river at Beck's island, a short distance above
Falmouth, and extend in a semicircular form to the Massaponax
river, about 6 miles below the town. On the opposite bank are
the Stafford heights, running almost parallel with the stream,
and at no great distance from it. About a mile below
Fredericksburg a little creek called Deep run flows into the
Rappahannock from the southwest, the widest part of the valley
being along this stream. Burnside had laid his plans to cross
the Rappahannock at a place called Skinker's neck, some 12
miles below the town, but Lee became aware of his intentions
and concentrated a strong force in that neighborhood, thus
forcing the Union general to change his designs, almost at the
beginning of the campaign. His reasons for this change are
besttold in the language of his official report: "I discovered
that the enemy had thrown a large portion of his force down
the river and elsewhere, thus weakening his defenses in front,
and I thought I also discovered that did not anticipate the
crossing of our whole force at Fredericksburg; and I hoped, by
rapidly throwing the whole command over at that place to
separate, by a vigorous attack, the forces of the enemy on the
river below from the forces behind and on the crests in the
rear of the town, in which case we should fight him with great
advantages in our favor." To carry out this plan it was
determined to throw two pontoon bridges across the river near
the Lacy house, at the upper end of the town, one a short
distance below the railroad bridge, and one or two about a
mile further down. On the night of Dec. 10, the pontoons were
taken to the designated places, and 147 pieces of artillery
ranged along Stafford heights to cover the crossing. About 4
a.m. on the 11th, work was commenced on the bridges near the
town and everything proceeded well until dawn, when the
pontoniers were driven from their work by a brisk fire from a
body of Confederate sharpshooters sheltered by a line of
rifle-pits and concealed in the houses along the river bank.
About 6 o'clock work was resumed, but again the men were
forced to retire before the fire of the sharpshooters.
As early as Nov. 21, Gen. Sumner had notified the mayor
of Fredericksburg that the town would be shelled if the
Confederates were permitted to occupy it for military
purposes, and after the second repulse of the pontoniers the
artillery was directed to open fire on the town. Several
batteries accordingly began shelling the houses that sheltered
the riflemen, and at the same time the 7th Mich. and 19th
Mass. were sent over in pontoons. Under cover of the
artillery they charged up the bank and chased the
sharpshooters from their hiding places. The bridges were then
finished without further interruption and before dark Sumner's
grand division and part of Hooker's had crossed. Franklin met
with no opposition at the lower bridges and that evening the
greater part of his grand division was on the south side of
the Rappahannock. On the 12th, all the army was crossed over,
with the exception of Stoneman's and Butterfield's corps,
which were held in a position to reinforce any part of the
line that might require assistance and to keep open the line
of retreat in case it became necessary to retire. From
official reports and published accounts it would seem that no
definite plan of battle had been decided on until after the
troops were over the river. Burnside says: "By the night of
the 12th, the troops were all in position, and I visited the
different commands with a view to determining as to future
movements."
Near the south end of the ridge, on which the enemy was
entrenched, a road led from the old Richmond stage road and
crossed the railroad at a place known as Hamilton's crossing.
From Fredericksburg the plank road ran in a southwesterly
direction to Orange Court House. Near the foot of the heights
the Telegraph road left the plank road and crossed the ridge
farther south. The Confederates had opened a road in the rear
of the crest, running from the Telegraph road to Hamilton's
crossing, and further north the canal ran along the foot of
the ridge. The plan finally adopted was for Franklin on the
left to march down the Richmond road and seize the heights
near Hamilton's crossing; Sumner was to move out on the plank
road to the intersection of the Telegraph road, there divide
his forces "with a view to seizing the heights in the rear of
the town;" Hooker was ordered to place Butterfield's corps and
Whipple's division of Stoneman's in position to cross at the
three upper bridges to support Sumner, and the remaining
divisions of Stoneman's corps at the lower bridge to cross
over and support Franklin.
At daylight on Saturday morning, Dec. 13, a dense fog
hung in the valley, completely concealing the movements of the
two armies from each other. Toward 10 o'clock this fog lifted
and Franklin began his advance Smith's corps formed the right,
with Brooks' division on the right, Howe's on the left and
Newton's in reserve. Gibbon's division of Reynolds' corps
touched Howe's left, Meade's was formed at almost right angles
to the main line of battle and facing to the left.
Confronting this part of the Union line were the divisions of
Ewell, (now commanded by Brig.-Gen. Jubal A. Early) D. H. and
A. P. Hill and Taliaferro, occupying the wooded slopes of the
hill, and Hood's division stretched across the Deep run valley
west of the railroad. D. H. Hill's division overlapped the
Union left, and as soon as Meade began to move against the
Confederate lines he was met by an artillery fire in front and
on the left flank, compelling him to fall back. Doubleday's
division was thrown against the batteries on the flank and
gained some ground, but the artillery was well supported and
could not be dislodged. Three batteries were then ordered to
Doubleday's support and after a terrific fire of nearly an
hour the Confederate guns were silenced. Meade then opened a
fierce artillery fire on the woods in his front, and as this
met with no response he pushed his line forward. It happened
that his advance struck a piece of boggy ground, which the
enemy had deemed impassable, and had caused a gap to be left
in the line. Into this opening the Union column now forced
its way, sweeping back the enemy on the right and left, and
gaining the military road in the rear of the crest. Here part
of the second Confederate line was thrown into confusion, but
part of Gregg's brigade of A. P. Hill's division withstood the
shock and held the Federals in check until Early could come up
with reinforcements. When Meade made his rush he expected to
be supported by Gibbon, but the latter was delayed and Meade
found himself almost surrounded by a force outnumbering his
own two to one. Hood hurried part of his command to that part
of the field, checking Gibbon as he came up. Pursuant to
Burnside's order Franklin had held the greater part of his
grand division "in position for a rapid advance down the
Richmond road," so that the main body of his forces was too
far away to render assistance to those engaged. Finding
themselves unsupported Meade's men broke and fled in disorder,
leaving a large number of dead and wounded on the field and
several hundred prisoners in the hands of the enemy.
Stoneman's corps had crossed the river, however, and Birney's
division was drawn up in the rear of Meade. The Confederates,
so intent upon the death or capture of the retreating
Unionists, failed to perceive this line and dashed up to
within 50 yards of Birney's guns. Four batteries opened with
heavy charges of canister, fairly sweeping the pursuers from
their feet and causing their decimated ranks to beat a rapid
and disorderly retreat to the woods. This ended the
operations on the left.
In the meantime a fiercer conflict was being waged on the
Union right, between Sumner and Longstreet. Shortly after 8
a.m. Willcox's corps was ordered to the left to connect with
Franklin's line, and to Couch was committed the work of
carrying the Confederate position at Marye's hill, located
between the plank and Telegraph roads and so called from the
name of the owner, who lived on the summit. Some idea of the
strength of the enemy's position here may be gained from the
following extract from Confederate Gen. Kershaw's report:
"Marye's hill, covered with our batteries, falls off abruptly
toward Fredericksburg to a stone wall, which forms a terrace
on the side of the hill and the outer margin of the Telegraph
road, which winds along the foot of the hill. The road is
about 25 feet wide, and is faced by a stone wall about 4 feet
high on the city side. The road having been cut out of the
side of the hill, this last wall in many places is not visible
above the surface of the ground. * * * I found, on my arrival,
that Cobb's brigade, Col. McMillan commanding, occupied our
entire front, and my troops could only get into position by
doubling on them. This was accordingly done, and the
formation along most of the line during the engagement was
consequently four deep."
Against this strongly fortified line, "four deep" the
Union troops were compelled to march nearly a mile across open
ground, every foot of which, except a narrow strip along the
canal or mill race, could be swept by the Confederate
batteries on Marye's hill and the ridges to the right and
left. To make matters worse the canal could be crossed only
at two bridges, on one of which the floor had been torn up, so
that the men were compelled to cross in single file on the
stringers. In the face of these obstacles the attack on the
hill was commenced about noon, French's division forming the
advance in columns by brigades, covered by a strong line of
skirmishers, and closely supported by Hancock. After crossing
the canal the lines were formed under shelter of the bank, on
the strip of ground referred to, and steadily moved forward
until Kimball's brigade came within short musket range of the
wall, the enemy having been driven to cover by the
skirmishers. Hancock pushed forward Zook's brigade, which
joined Kimball's in the assault on the wall, but both were
driven back with severe losses, Kimball being wounded while
leading the charge. Hancock then sent in Meagher's and
Caldwell's brigades, but with no better success.
In the forks of the road, about 15O yards from the wall,
was a cluster of houses, which formed a rallying point for the
Union troops. About 1 p.m. Couch ordered French and Hancock
to carry the works by storm. Then, in company with Gen.
Howard, he climbed the tower of the court-house, from which he
could obtain a clear view of the field. Seeing that the works
could not be carried by direct assault, he ordered Howard to
move his division to the right of the Telegraph road in an
effort to turn the enemy's flank. Before the order could be
carried out French and Hancock called for reinforcements.
Howard was recalled and sent to their assistance. Willcox
also sent Sturgis' division to the left of Hancock and about 2
p.m. Butterfield's whole corps came on the field. Shortly
after this Hooker was ordered to "put in everything," Couch at
the same time being directed to "hold on until he comes in."
By this time the ammunition of several regiments of the 2nd
corps was exhausted, the men relying wholly upon the bayonet.
About 4 o'clock word came that the Confederates were
retreating from the Marye house on the top of the hill, and
Humphrey's division was ordered in. Twice in quick succession
he charged against that impregnable stone wall, but each time
was repulsed. Getty's division of the 9th corps was next
ordered to endeavor to break the enemy's line on the left,
near the unfinished railroad, but was met by a heavy fire.
Hazard's and Frank's batteries were ordered to his support,
and while they succeeded in checking the fire they were
unable, even by a vigorous shelling, to break the line. In
fact, of all the assaults made during the day none approached
as near to the Confederate lines as did Kimball and Zook in
the first charge.
Thus the battle was waged, first at one point and then
another until dark, when the men were withdrawn and that night
the main part of the army bivouacked in the streets of
Fredericksburg. On Sunday morning, the 14th, the men began
digging trenches along the edge of the town in anticipation of
an assault, but with the exception of some desultory firing at
various points along the line there were no hostile
demonstrations. On Monday Jackson and Franklin agreed upon a
formal truce for the removal of the wounded and the burial of
the dead. Late that afternoon Burnside issued orders for the
whole army to recross the Rappahannock. Under cover of
darkness, in the midst of a cold rain storm, the defeated and
dispirited army crossed the river and the pontoons were
withdrawn. The first battle of Burnside's campaign had been
fought and lost. The Union losses at Fredericksburg were
1,284 killed, 9'600 wounded, and 1,769 missing. The
Confederate losses were reported as being 608 killed, 4,116
wounded and 653 missing. Many of the Federal dead were
stripped of their clothing by the enemy, the naked bodies
being left exposed to the cold wintry winds and rain. A woman
who lived in one of the houses near the stone wall said
afterward: "The morning after the battle the field was blue;
but the morning after the Federals withdrew the field was
white."
Source: The Union Army, vol. 5
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