In the Union line of battle on Sunday morning the
                position of the left and center remained the same, except
                Howard's corps was moved to the extreme left, where no attack
                was likely to be made.  The left was held by Hancock, the
                center by Slocum, and the right, facing west by Sickles and
                French's division of Couch's corps.  Sickles, extreme left
                (Birney's division) occupied the little plateau of Hazel
                grove, which commanded the Union center, and if won by the
                enemy he could pour an enfilading fire into Slocum's ranks.
                During the night Reynolds' corps had come up.  It was placed
                so as to. guard the roads to Ely's and the United States
                fords, and occupied the position which had been Jackson's
                objective point.  After Jackson was wounded the command of the
                corps fell on Stuart, who was busy all night reorganizing his
                forces.  At dawn he swung his right through the woods toward
                Hazel grove, from which all the Union troops had been
                withdrawn with the exception of Graham's brigade. Graham
                mistook the movement for an attack and a sharp skirmish
                ensued, which resulted in the Federals evacuating the hill and
                retiring to Fairview.  Stuart was quick to see the advantage
                he had gained.  He immediately occupied the hill with 30
                pieces of artillery and opened fire on Chancellorsville.  His
                next move was to attack Sickles on the Fairview ridge.
                Sickles obstinately defended his position for over two hours,
                repulsing several assaults, and then sent for reinforcements.
                Just as the request reached headquarters Hooker was knocked
                senseless by a cannon ball from Hazel grove, which struck the
                pillar against which he was leaning.  There was no one with
                authority to send Sickles the desired assistance, though Meade
                and Reynolds were both disengaged and either corps would have
                been sufficient to enable Sickles to hold his position, or
                even to assume the offensive and secure a victory.  Sickles
                fought on until his ammunition was exhausted, when he withdrew
                his useless artillery, fell back to a second line, only
                partially fortified, and prepared to hold that by bayonet.
                Just then French made a determined attack on the Confederate
                left and forced it back.  This was the only offensive movement
                of the Union forces that day, and Stuart rushed reinforcements
                to the spot, quickly repelling the assault.  Had half of
                Reynolds' corps, lying idle a short distance away, been
                ordered up Stuart's army might have been destroyed.  During
                this time Slocum's line had been subjected to a heavy fire
                from the artillery at Hazel grove, and Hancock was threatened.
                By 10 a. m. Lee and Stuart had succeeded in effecting a
                junction of their forces, and with 40,000 men began pressing
                on toward Chancellorsville, opposed by probably 30,000 under
                Sickles, French and Slocum.  The 42,000 of Meade, Howard and
                Reynolds, all within easy call, remained inactive.  Again the
                assault fell on Sickles, who was without ammunition.  Five
                times he repulsed the enemy with bayonets.  Then the
                overwhelming numbers of the enemy hurled against him compelled
                him to give way and the army fell back to a line which had
                been mapped out the evening before.

                     Here was a strong position.  The left was protected by
                the ravine of Mineral Spring run, the right by the ravines of
                the Big and Little Hunting runs, leaving only a narrow front
                open to attack, and this was not easy to approach by a line of
                any extent.  Hooker had here over 70,000 men, while Lee's
                strength was barely 40,000.  Notwithstanding this disparity of
                numbers he was preparing to renew the fight when he received
                the news that Sedgwick and Gibbon were between him and
                Fredericksburg, ready to fall on his rear or overpower Early
                and cut the Confederate communications.  At 11 p. m. on
                Saturday, the 2nd, Sedgwick received the order to join Hooker.
                It was daylight before his advance reached the left and rear
                of Fredericksburg.  Marye's hill was carried by assault at
                11 o'clock and Sedgwick was between Lee and Early with his
                corps of 22,000 men.  Gibbon, with his division of 5,000, had
                crossed over from Falmouth as soon as the town had been taken,
                and moved to the right, but was checked by the artillery fire
                and held at the canal until after the storming of the heights.
                Gibbon was left to hold the town and cover the bridges and
                Sedgwick sent back for Brooks' division, which had been left 3
                miles below the town, to come forward and take the advance.
                This delayed Sedgwick's movements until 3 p. m., giving Lee
                time to send four brigades to check the Federal advance.  At
                Salem Church this detachment met the Confederates that had
                been driven from Marye's heights, and a stand was made on a
                low ridge covered with timber.  An attack by Brooks and Newton
                drove the Confederates from this position, but reinforcements
                coming up the Union forces were in turn compelled to fall
                back, closely pressed by the enemy until he was checked by the
                artillery.  Both armies lay that night on the field.

                     On Monday morning, May 4, Lee's army was in an extremely
                hazardous position.  His entire strength was less than 50,000
                men and this force was scattered.  Stuart's corps, with the
                greater part of Anderson's division, was in front of Hooker at
                Chancellorsville; McLaws, with about 10,000, was at Salem
                Church, holding Sedgwick in check, and Early, with 8,000, was
                3 miles farther south.  Thus divided the Confederate army
                ought to have fallen an easy prey to the superior force of the
                Federals.  But it was saved by the good generalship of Lee and
                the inactivity of Hooker.  The remainder of Anderson's
                division was quietly withdrawn from Stuart and sent against
                Sedgwick.  Early recaptured Marye's hill, forcing Gibbon to
                abandon Fredericksburg and recross the river, and then moved
                to join Anderson.  At 11 a. m. Sedgwick found himself
                encompassed on three sides by the enemy.  He reported the
                situation to Hooker and asked the active support of the main
                army.  In reply he was directed not to attack unless the main
                body at Chancellorsville did so.  This order placed him on the
                defensive.  At 4 p. m. he formed his corps-now less than
                20,000 men-with Howe facing Early on the east, Newton, with
                Russell's brigade of Brooks' division, facing west against
                McLaws, while Brooks' other two brigades were facing Anderson
                on the south.  Within the three sides of this square, both
                flanks of which rested on the river, was Banks' ford, his line
                of retreat in case he was compelled to abandon his position.
                His entire line was thin and was confronted by a superior
                force.  He realized that his position was precarious, but he
                determined to hold it until dark as an attempt to cross the
                river in the daytime would sacrifice a large part of his
                command.  About 6 p. m. three guns were fired in quick
                succession from one of the Confederate batteries.  This was
                the signal for the attack and the whole line began to advance.
                The assault fell the heaviest on Howe in an effort to cut off
                the Federals from the ford Newton was not assailed and Brooks
                easily repulsed the attack on his line.  Howe's artillery did
                effective work on Early's column and threw it into confusion.
                Taking advantage of the situation Howe advanced his right and
                captured the greater part of the 8th La. regiment, but the
                movement exposed his left and he was compelled to fall back to
                a position previously selected.  The enemy took this for a
                retreat and charged bringing his flank opposite the Vermont
                brigade stationed in a little piece of woods.  This brigade
                opened a galling fire and Early beat a precipitate retreat.
                After the attack on his lines in the morning Sedgwick sent
                word to Hooker that he could hold his position.  Before Hooker
                received that dispatch he had sent Sedgwick an order to cross
                the river.  After receiving it he countermanded the order, but
                Sedgwick did not receive the countermand in time.  Gen.
                Benham, of the engineers, had thrown a bridge across at
                Scott's dam, about a mile below Banks' ford, on the 3rd. While
                the attack on Sedgwick was in progress he threw over another,
                and this precaution enabled Sedgwick to save his corps.  Soon
                after dark the order was issued to fall back to the north bank
                of the Rappahannock and by daylight the next morning the
                entire command was encamped on the Falmouth road a mile from
                the ford

                     On Sunday night Hooker called a council of war, at which
                it was decided to recross the Rappahannock.  Some difficulty
                was encountered in crossing, owing to a sudden rise in the
                river, but by the 6th the entire army was on the north side,
                and the disastrous Chancellorsville campaign was ended.  In the
                several engagements the Union army lost 1,606 killed, 9,762
                wounded, and 5,919 missing.  The Confederate losses, as given
                by brigade and division commanders, aggregated 1,649 killed,
                9,106 wounded, and 1,708 captured or missing.

                Source: The Union Army, vol. 5

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