CHANCELLORSVILLE, VA
                                      MAY 1ST -4TH, 1863

                     Chancellorsville, Va., May 1-4, 1863.  Army of the
                Potomac. Gen. Hooker superseded Gen. Burnside in command of
                the Army of the Potomac on Jan. 26, 1863.  As nothing in the
                way of active operations could be undertaken in the dead of
                winter, more than two months were spent in getting the army in
                good condition.  During that time it remained in its winter
                quarters on the left bank of the Rappahannock river opposite
                Fredericksburg.  It consisted of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th,
                11th and 12th army corps, respectively commanded by Maj.-Gens.
                John F. Reynolds, Darius N. Couch, Daniel E. Sickles, George
                G. Meade, John Sedgwick, Oliver O. Howard and Henry W. Slocum,
                and the cavalry corps, commanded by Brig.-Gen. George
                Stoneman.  In round numbers Hooker had 111,000 infantry,
                11,000 cavalry, and 8,000 artillery, with 404 guns.  Opposed
                to this force was Lee's army, the Army of Northern Virginia,
                made up of the 1st and 2nd army corps.  The former was
                commanded by Gen. James Longstreet and the latter by Gen.
                Thomas J. (Stonewall) Jackson.  Longstreet, with two divisions
                and two battalions of artillery, was absent in southeastern
                Virginia, so the troops with Lee numbered about 57,000
                infantry, 3,000 cavalry, and probably 170 pieces of artillery.
                This force lay at Fredericksburg, on the south side of the
                Rappahannock, where all winter Lee had been watching the
                movements of the Federals.

                     Early in April Hooker advised his officers of his plan of
                campaign.  Stoneman, with the main body of the cavalry, was to
                move up the Rappahannock, cross at the upper fords and cut
                Lee's communication with his base of supplies at Richmond.
                After crossing the river the cavalry was to divide into two
                columns; one, under Gen. Averell, was to attack Gordonsville
                and Culpeper, and the other, commanded by Gen. Buford, was to
                reach the Fredericksburg railroad via Louisa Court House.  The
                two divisions were then to unite south of the Pamunkey river
                to harass Lee's retreat from Fredericksburg which all felt was
                sure to come. Stoneman started on his mission on April 13, but
                heavy rains had made the river unfordable and he was compelled
                to wait until the 28th before he could effect a crossing.
                This delay interfered somewhat with the original plans, but on
                the evening of the 26th Hooker issued orders for the corps of
                Meade.  Howard and Slocum to move the next morning in light
                marching order for Kelly's ford, 27 miles above Fredericksburg
                where they were to cross, then press rapidly forward, cross
                the Rapidan, sweep down the southern bank and strike the
                Confederate army on the left flank.  Couch, with two of his
                divisions, was to proceed to the United States ford and be in
                readiness to cross as soon as the Confederate force there
                should be driven away by the Federal advance. Gibbon's
                division of this corps was left in camp at Falmouth, where it
                was in plain view of the Confederates, and to move it might
                give Lee some idea of Hooker's intentions.  To further confuse
                the enemy demonstrations had been made for several days at
                various points along the river.  To prevent Lee from sending a
                strong force against the four corps operating above
                Fredericksburg Sedgwick with his own corps and those of
                Reynolds and Sickles, was to cross below the town and make a
                demonstration to draw the attention of the enemy in that
                direction.

                     On Monday morning, April 27, the troops moved according
                to instructions, and reached Kelly's ford late in the
                afternoon next day.  A detachment was sent across in boats to
                drive away the picket guard, and by daylight the next morning
                all were over and on the way to the Rapidan.  Stoneman crossed
                his cavalry at the same time.  Pleasonton's brigade of
                cavalry, with two batteries, was attached to Slocum's corps
                and this was all of that arm that participated in the battles
                of Chancellorsville, the rest of Stoneman's command moving
                toward Culpeper.  Meade crossed the Rapidan at Ely's ford and
                the other two corps at Germanna ford, 10 miles above.  As soon
                as Meade's column appeared on the south side of the
                Rappahannock opposite the United States ford Couch threw the
                pontoons across and passed his two divisions over.  On the
                afternoon of the 30th the four corps were concentrated at
                Chancellorsville.  Sedgwick waited until the 28th, to give the
                other division of the army time to reach Kelly's ford, and
                then moved down the river with the 1st, 3rd and 6th corps to a
                point near the old Franklin crossing, where they bivouacked
                for the night.  Early the next morning the 1st and 6th corps
                were crossed over, leaving Sickles' corps on the north side as
                a reserve and to cover the advance with his artillery.  A
                small force of the enemy in rifle pits disputed the passage of
                the river, but a detachment sent over in boats soon drove them
                from their position.  The Confederates then contented
                themselves with shelling the advancing troops from the
                batteries on the heights.  When it became evident that no
                serious attack was to be made on Sedgwick, Sickles' corps was
                ordered to join the forces at Chancellorsville and moved on
                the 30th.  Sedgwick then disposed his forces in such a way as
                to lead Lee to think a large body of troops was below the
                town, and that an attack was likely to come from that quarter.
                Had the feint succeeded the story of Chancellorsville might
                have been differently told.  In his report Lee says: "No
                demonstration was made opposite any other part of our lines at
                Fredericksburg, and the strength of the force that had crossed
                and its apparent indisposition to attack indicated that the
                principal effort of the enemy would be made in some other
                quarter.  This impression was confirmed by intelligence
                received from Gen. Stuart that a large body of infantry and
                artillery was passing up the river.  During the forenoon of
                the 29th, that officer reported that the enemy had crossed in
                force near Kelly's ford on the preceding evening.  Later in
                the day he announced that a heavy column was moving from
                Kelly's toward Germanna ford, on the Rapidan, and another
                toward Ely's ford on that river.  The routes they were
                pursuing after crossing the Rapidan converge near
                Chancellorsville, whence several roads lead to the rear of our
                position at Fredericksburg."

                     This was the first intimation Lee had of Hooker's real
                purpose.  Upon receipt of this information he sent a dispatch
                to Gen. Anderson, as follows: "I have received reliable
                intelligence that the enemy have crossed the river in force.
                Why have you not kept me informed? I wish to see you at my
                headquarters at once."  The bearer of that dispatch was
                captured by some of the Union cavalry.  The cavalry had also
                captured a picket, among whom was an engineer officer
                belonging to Stuart's staff, and who had in his possession a
                diary containing the record of a council, held by the
                Confederate generals some weeks before, in which it was
                decided that the next battle was likely to be fought in the
                vicinity of Chancellorsville, and that it would be well to
                seize and prepare a position there.  This diary and Lee's
                dispatch were turned over to Hooker by Pleasonton, who
                suggested that, as Lee was now advised of the movements of the
                Union forces and was expecting a fight at Chancellorsville, it
                might be good tactics to forestall him by moving on toward
                Fredericksburg and selecting a new position.  Here was
                Hooker's golden opportunity, but he allowed it to pass.  Lee
                remained in Fredericksburg until the 30th, still uncertain as
                to Sedgwick's motives, and fearing to move in either direction
                until he had a better understanding of the situation.  Hooker
                on the 29th had over 45,000 men, and Sickles had orders to
                join him the next day with his corps, numbering 18,000 more.
                Failing to receive Lee's dispatch ordering him to
                headquarters, Anderson retired to Tabernacle Church and
                commenced entrenching.  This was the only force to prevent
                Hooker from pressing forward, seizing Banks' ford, thus
                shortening the distance between himself and Sedgwick by at
                least 10 miles, and forcing Lee to meet him at a disadvantage
                on ground where the superior numbers of the Federals meant
                certain victory.

                     Late on the 30th Lee became fully convinced that Sedgwick
                did not intend to attack.  Leaving Early's division and
                Barksdale's brigade to hold Fredericksburg, the remainder of
                the Confederate forces were concentrated in front of Hooker.
                A little after sunrise on May 1 McLaws' division joined
                Anderson, and three divisions of Jackson's corps arrived on
                the field about 8 o'clock.  Three hours later Hooker began his
                advance in four columns, each preceded by a detachment of
                cavalry.  Howard and Slocum moved on the plank road to the
                right, Sykes' division of Meade's corps and Hancock's division
                of Couch's took the turnpike; the other two divisions of
                Meade's corps (Humphreys' and Griffin's) took the river road
                toward Banks' ford; French's division was to march south to
                Todd's tavern, while Sickles' corps was held at
                Chancellorsville and Dowdall's tavern, as a reserve and to
                guard the ford against Fitz Hugh Lee's cavalry.  Hooker's
                object was to form a line of battle with his left resting on
                Banks' ford and his right on Tabernacle Church, which was to
                be his headquarters.  But the ground, which might have been
                occupied the day before almost without a struggle, was now in
                possession of the enemy.  When Jackson reached Tabernacle
                Church, he stopped the work of entrenching and moved forward
                to meet Hooker.  Sykes, therefore, had not proceeded more than
                a mile before he encountered McLaws' division deployed on both
                sides of the pike.  McLaws fell back steadily for a mile, when
                he was reinforced by Anderson and Ramseur, and the
                Confederates now assumed the offensive.  Sykes tried to
                connect his line with Slocum by throwing out a regiment as
                skirmishers, but the movement failed.  Anderson succeeded in
                getting on his flank, and he was compelled to fall back behind
                Hancock, whose command then came to the front and engaged the
                enemy.  Sykes then secured a strong position, which he was
                preparing to hold, when the orders came for all to fall back
                to the positions they held early in the morning.  Couch and
                Hancock protested against anything like a retreat.  The
                general position was a good one.  The infantry was almost
                clear of the woods and thickets, and there was plenty of open
                space in which the artillery could be used effectively.  Gen.
                Warren, chief engineer on Hooker's staff, urged Couch and
                Hancock to hold their positions until he could consult Hooker,
                but the latter would not rescind the order to retire.
                Subsequently he countermanded the order and directed the
                troops to return to their positions, but it was too late, as
                the enemy was already in possession of the ridge.

                     Meantime Meade's column had come within sight of Banks'
                ford without seeing anything of the enemy when the order was
                received to fall back to Chancellorsville.  Both divisions
                started to return, but Griffin was ordered to form on
                Hancock's left, where about 6 p. m. he aided in repulsing the
                enemy in an advance on Sykes' position, after which they went
                into bivouac for the night.  Humphreys was sent to the extreme
                left of the line to guard the approaches to the United States
                ford.  French, who had moved in the morning via Todd's tavern,
                came within sight of the Confederates, but was ordered to fall
                back before he could engage them.  During the afternoon a new
                line was formed with Meade on the left toward Fredericksburg
                facing east, Slocum in the center facing south, Howard on the
                right facing west, with Couch and Sickles in reserve, except
                one brigade from each division, which occupied positions in
                the front line.  The left and center were protected in front
                by ravines, through which ran small brooks, but on the right
                there was nothing but the thickets to hinder a near approach
                of the enemy in an attack on Howard.  As thus formed the line
                covered all the roads passing through Chancellorsville.  Late
                in the day an assault was made by Wright and Stuart on the
                advance portion of Slocum's corps and it was driven back on
                the main body.  Artillery was then brought up and a heavy fire
                directed against Slocum, but he held his position.  An
                artillery fire was also opened on Hancock's line, when Knap's
                battery replied with such effectiveness that the Confederates
                gave up the attempt to drive the Union troops back by this
                method.  Owing to the thickets, which screened the Federal
                army, Lee was at a loss where to direct his attacks, and the
                waning hours of the day were spent in a number of pretended
                assaults at various points to ascertain if possible, just how
                Hooker's forces were posted.  These demonstrations developed
                the fact that the lines in front of Chancellorsville were
                impregnable.  Lee and Jackson held a consultation about dark
                to determine the course they should pursue on the following
                day. Stuart had learned the weakness of the Union right and
                had communicated his knowledge to Jackson, who now advised a
                flank movement against that part of the line.

                     During the night the roads were picketed by the Federal
                cavalry while within the lines of both armies could be heard
                the sound of the ax as the contending forces engaged in
                strengthening their fronts by log breastworks, etc.  In some
                places along the Union line this work was continued far into
                the next day.  Long before daylight on the morning of the 3rd
                Jackson was up and studying a rough map of the country to find
                a route to the right and rear of the Union army.  An old
                resident was found, who pointed out a way, and at sunrise
                Jackson with his three divisions, was on the march.  For some
                distance the movement was hidden by the dense forest, and then
                a point was reached where the by-road ran over a hill in plain
                view of Sickles' position.  It was readily seen that it was a
                movement in force, but as the road here ran due south and
                directly away from the Federals, it was thought the
                Confederate retreat was begun.  Gen. Birney reported the
                matter to Sickles and at the same time directed a section of
                Clark's rifled battery to fire a few shots at the moving
                column.  The range was easily found and Birney ordered the
                rest of the battery to the same position.  The artillery fire
                was so effective that the column was apparently thrown into
                confusion, hurrying forward to get out of range of the guns.
                This fact added to the belief that the enemy was in full
                retreat.  This was about 8 a. m. Hooker was at once notified
                of the affair and was inclined to believe that the
                Confederates were retiring.  Realizing, however, that it might
                be one of the flank movements for which Jackson was noted, he
                issued orders to Slocum and Howard to strengthen their lines
                as much as possible and advance their pickets "to obtain
                timely information of their approach."

                     At noon Sickles received orders to follow Jackson and
                harass his movements.  Birney's division, with two battalions
                of Berdan's sharpshooters and Randolph's battery, were hurried
                forward, supported by Whipple's division. Birney's advance was
                checked by a 12-pounder battery at the iron foundry near
                Welford's house, but Livingston's battery was brought up and
                soon silenced the enemy's guns.  Pleasonton's cavalry was also
                brought up as a reinforcement, but the woods being too thick
                to permit its use to advantage, Sickles advised Pleasonton to
                return to the open space near Scott's run.  Sickles wanted to
                cut off the divisions of Anderson and McLaws and capture them,
                and sent for reinforcements for that purpose.  He was promised
                the rest of his own corps, as well as support from Slocum and
                Howard, and was preparing to attack, when Hooker changed his
                mind and recalled the reinforcements.  About 300 prisoners
                were taken, however, and from these it was learned that
                Jackson's purpose was to strike a blow on the right.  But the
                information came too late to be of service.

                     All day Lee had been keeping up a demonstration against
                the Union left and center; now directing a heavy cannonade
                against Meade; now a musketry fire against Couch and Slocum;
                followed by an attack on Hancock, who occupied a position in
                advance of the main line.  These movements were intended to
                create the impression that the principal assault was to be
                made in that quarter, and to draw attention from Jackson.  By
                3 p. m. Jackson had reached the plank road, within 2 miles of
                Howard's corps.  Howard had neglected to observe Hooker's
                order of the morning to advance his pickets in order to guard
                against a surprise.  Even when informed by Capt. Farmer, of
                Pleasonton's staff, that a Confederate battery was posted
                directly on his flank he did not believe that any attack was
                intended against his corps.  The Confederate pickets,
                therefore crept through the thickets unmolested and accurately
                reported Howard's position.  Jackson formed his forces in
                three lines, Rodes in front, then Colston, then A. P. Hill,
                his formation reaching some distance on either side of the
                road and completely enveloping the front, flank and rear of
                the 11th corps.  Anderson and McLaws had orders, as soon as
                the sound of Jackson's guns was heard, to make a feint of
                attacking the Union left to prevent aid being sent to Howard,
                and at the same time to press gradually to their left until
                they connected with Jackson's right, when the whole force was
                to close on the Federal center.  It was 5 p. m. when Jackson
                formed his lines for the final attack Howard's men had stacked
                their arms and were preparing their suppers.  Some were
                playing cards, and all were unprepared for the assault that
                was soon to arouse them from their fancied security.
                Entrenchments had been thrown up but they were not manned.
                Not even the shot of a solitary picket alarmed the corps.
                With a yell and a volley of musketry the Confederates dashed
                out of the woods upon the defenseless Federals, who fled in
                confusion without firing a shot.  A few made an attempt to
                withstand the advance, but they were swept from their position
                and joined their comrades now streaming through the woods
                toward Chancellorsville.  The wild rush of the fugitives
                aroused Hooker to action.  His staff vainly tried to rally the
                panic-stricken troops, making it necessary to form a new line
                immediately to prevent Jackson from sweeping everything before
                him.  But it was not an easy matter to find men for the
                formation of this new line, for as soon as Lee heard the sound
                of Jackson's attack he immediately engaged tile whole line to
                prevent any aid being sent to Howard.  Berry's division
                happened to be in reserve at a convenient distance.  He was
                ordered to move at once, form across the plank road and drive
                the Confederates back, or at least hold them in check until
                reinforcements could be sent to him.  But the check to
                Jackson's impetuous onslaught came from a different and
                somewhat unexpected quarter.  When Pleasonton left Sickles at
                the iron foundry he proceeded leisurely back to Hazel grove
                with the 8th and 17th Penn. cavalry and Martin's battery of
                horse artillery.  Upon reaching the open space he had left a
                short time before he found it filled with a confused mass of
                men, guns, caissons and ambulances, all bent on getting out of
                the way as soon as possible.  Charging upon this disorderly
                aggregation he cleared the space for action.  To gain time,
                for the enemy was already forming for another attack, he
                ordered Maj. Keenan of the 8th Penn. to charge the Confederate
                lines.  This was bravely done, though Keenan and 32 of his men
                never returned.  Pleasonton next ordered Martin to bring his
                guns into battery, load them with double charges of canister,
                and aim so that the shot would strike the ground some distance
                in advance of the approaching enemy, but not to fire until
                orders were given.  Just at this juncture Lieut. Crosby, of
                the 4th U. S. artillery, reported to Pleasonton that he had a
                battery of 6 guns at hand.  This was placed by the side of
                Martin's battery, giving Pleasonton l2 guns, and to get more a
                detachment of the 17th Penn. charged on the stragglers and
                took possession of 10 pieces, which were brought quickly into
                line.  It was now dusk.  Keenan's charge, although disastrous
                to himself, had gained for Pleasonton a valuable quarter of an
                hour.  The Confederate line emerged from the woods bearing a
                Union flag which had been dropped by some of the flying
                troops.  They called out not to shoot as they were friends,
                but a moment later discharged a volley directly at the men
                behind the guns.  Pleasonton then gave the order to fire.  The
                whole line of guns, double-shotted and aimed low, belched
                forth a murderous discharge of iron hail that swept the
                advancing Confederates off their feet.  Before the line could
                be reformed the guns were again loaded and again that shower
                of death-dealing missiles was sent hurtling through the ranks
                of the enemy.  The cannonade continued for fully 20 minutes,
                when the Confederates gave up the attempt to storm the battery
                and retired to the woods.

                     When Berry received the order to move out and recapture
                the works of the routed 11th corps he promptly obeyed, but
                found a large force of the enemy in possession.  He then
                formed his line in the valley in front and held his position
                there to await developments.  Warren had stopped several of
                the retreating batteries and now formed them across the plank
                road in the rear of the infantry.  When Pleasonton opened fire
                on the enemy Warren's guns were also brought into action and
                rendered effective service, while Berry steadily advanced his
                line, meanwhile keeping up an incessant fire of musketry up
                the road and into the woods.  About 8:30 the firing began to
                decrease and half an hour later ceased altogether.  Jackson
                ordered A. P. Hill's division to the front for the purpose of
                continuing the fight, and with his staff rode forward to
                examine the position.  He had not proceeded far when a fire
                from Berry's pickets warned him that the Federals were on the
                alert.  As he rode back to his lines Hill's men were just
                taking position.  Mistaking Jackson and his staff for Union
                cavalry some of them fired.  Half of his escort were killed or
                wounded.  He was struck by three balls, being wounded in both
                hands and his left arm.  He was taken to Guiney's station, to
                keep him from being captured, pneumonia set in and he died on
                May 10.

End of Report