Battle History
ANTIETAM, MD.
SEPT. 16-17TH, 1862
Antietam, Md., Sept. 16-17, 1862. Army of the Potomac.
In his report of the battle of South Mountain, which was
fought on the 14th, Gen. Meade says: "The command rested on
their arms during the night. The ammunition train was brought
up and the men's cartridge-boxes were filled, and every
preparation made to renew the contest at daylight the next
morning should the enemy be in force. Unfortunately, the
morning opened with a heavy mist, which prevented any view
being obtained, so that it was not until 7 a. m. that it was
ascertained that the enemy had retired from the mountain." As
soon as this discovery was made the whole Union army began
pouring through the passes of South Mountain in pursuit. At
Boonsboro Pleasonton's cavalry came up with the Confederate
rear guard. The 8th Ill., which was in the advance,
immediately charged and then pursued the retreating enemy for
a distance of 2 miles. There the Illinois regiment was joined
by a section of Tidball's battery, which threw a few shells
into the Confederate lines, completely routing the enemy from
the field. The Union loss in this skirmish was 1 killed and
15 wounded, while the Confederates left 30 killed and 50
wounded on the field, and a number of prisoners were taken.
About the time this engagement commenced another was taking
place on the Sharpsburg road, between the Confederate rear and
the 5th N. H. infantry. This skirmish lasted until 9 p. m.,
when the New Hampshire troops were relieved, after losing 4
men in killed and wounded. The enemy's loss here was 12
killed and wounded and 60 prisoners. The 2nd Del. and 52nd
N. Y. also skirmished with the rear guard at other points, and
in the afternoon the Confederates opened a heavy artillery
fire on the Federal advance near Antietam creek, keeping it up
until after dark. This was replied to by Tidball's horse
artillery and Battery B, 1st N. Y. light artillery, from the
heights east of the creek.
McClellan's hope was to bring on an engagement before the
Confederate forces could be united. Lee, on the other hand,
was bending every effort to concentrate his army in time to
resist the general attack which he now realized was imminent.
Stonewall Jackson, with his own division and those of Ewell
and A. P. Hill, was at Harper's Ferry. McLaws, after his
defeat at Crampton's pass on the 14th, formed his forces
across the lower end of Pleasant Valley, while the Union
forces under Gen. Franklin confronted him at the upper end of
the valley, about 2 miles distant. Here the two lay all day
on the 15th, each supposing the other to be superior in
strength and neither daring to attack. The morning of the
16th found Longstreet and D. H. Hill occupying a position on
the west side of the Antietam, between that stream and the
little town of Sharpsburg. Here Lee personally directed the
movements of his army, selecting the strongest possible ground
to withstand an attack until the detachments under Jackson and
McLaws could be united with the main body. Soon after
crossing the Antietam Lee learned that the Federal garrison at
Harper's Ferry had surrendered, and sent orders for the whole
force near the ferry to move at once to Sharpsburg. The Army
of the Potomac at this time was organized as follows:
The 1st army corps, commanded by Maj.-Gen. Joseph Hooker,
consisted of the divisions of Doubleday, Ricketts and Meade;
the 2nd corps, Maj.Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, included
Richardson's, Sedgwick's and French's divisions; Couch's
division of the 4th corps, the 5th corps, Maj.-Gen. Fitz John
Porter, was composed of the divisions of Morell Sykes and
Humphreys; the 6th corps, Maj.-Gen. William B. Franklin,
embraced the divisions of Slocum and W. F. Smith , the 9th
corps, Maj.-Gen Ambrose E. Burnside consisted of the divisions
of Willcox, Sturgis and Rodman, and the Kanawha division,
commanded by Brig.-Gen. Jacob D. Cox , the 12th corps, Maj.-
Gen. Joseph K. F. Mansfield, included the divisions of
Williams and Greene; the cavalry division numbering five
brigades and commanded by Brig.-Gen. Alfred Pleasonton, and
over 50 batteries of artillery. In his report of the campaign
McClellan gives the number of his forces at 87,164. Lee, in
his official report on the battle of Antietam, says: "This
great battle was fought by less than 40,000 men on our side "
The Confederate line of battle on the 16th extended from
the Potomac, at a point a little below Mercersville, to the
Antietam about a mile below Sharpsburg. It was nearly four
miles long and occupied a broken country, the low hills being
separated by narrow valleys, while almost everywhere the
limestone cropped out above the surface, affording a natural
shelter for the troops. In front the line was protected by
the Antietam, which was crossed by three bridges and several
fords, though the latter were all too difficult to attempt a
crossing with artillery. Near the south end of Lee's line was
the bridge afterward known as the "Burnside bridge;" on the
Sharpsburg and Boonsboro road, near the center of the line,
was the second bridge, while the third was the stone bridge on
the Williamsport road still further north. Near the mouth of
the stream was a fourth bridge, but it was not used during the
operations, except by A. P. Hill in bringing up his division
from Harper's Ferry. On the Hagerstown pike, about a mile
from Sharpsburg, stood the Dunker church in the edge of a
patch of timber, since known as the "West woods." At the
church the Smoketown road leaves the pike, and about half a
mile north on this road were some more timber patches called
the "East woods." In forming his line Lee posted Longstreet
on the right, so as to cover the Burnside bridge, and D. H.
Hill on the left, covering the bridge on the Boonsboro road.
On the opposite side of the Antietam lay the Union army with
the 1st corps on the extreme right and the 9th on the left.
McClellan established his headquarters at the Pry house, a
short distance northwest of the Boonsboro road and near the
center of his line. Lee's headquarters were at the west side
of Sharpsburg on the road leading to Shepherdstown.
Shortly after 1 p. m. on the 16th Hooker received orders
to cross the Antietam and attack the Confederate left.
Meade's and Ricketts, divisions crossed at the stone bridge
and Doubleday's at the ford just below. Once across the
stream he turned to the right in order to gain the watershed
between the Antietam and Potomac, intending to follow the
ridge until he gained the enemy's left flank. Some
skirmishing occurred along the line of march, and information
of Hooker's movements was at once carried to Lee. At the time
the messenger arrived Lee was in council with Longstreet and
Jackson, who had arrived from Harper's Ferry that morning.
Lee immediately ordered Jackson to the command of the left
wing and Hood's command was moved from the center to a
position near the Dunker church. A little while before sunset
Hooker pushed forward a battery and opened fire on Jackson's
left. The fire was promptly returned and the artillery duel
was continued until after dark, when the corps went into
bivouac a short distance north of the East woods, where the
men rested on their arms during the night, ready to begin the
attack the next morning. All that night there was desultory
firing between the pickets, who were so close to each other
that at times their footsteps could be heard. During the
night Mansfield's corps was sent over to the assistance of
Hooker and about 2 a. m. on the 17th took up a position on the
Poffenberger farm, about a mile in Hooker's rear. As soon as
it was light enough to distinguish objects on the morning of
the 17th the Federal skirmishers began their work in the East
woods. Soon afterward the entire corps was thrown into line
with Doubleday on the right, Ricketts on the left, and Meade
in reserve in the center, with instructions to reinforce
either of the other divisions as circumstances might require.
Thus formed the whole line moved forward and the real battle
of Antietam was begun. In the triangular space between the
Hagerstown and Smoketown roads, and directly in front of
Hooker, was a 30-acre field of corn in which the enemy had
stationed a large force of infantry during the night. Before
this force fired a shot its presence was discovered by the
sun's rays on the bayonets, and in his report Hooker says:
"Instructions were immediately given for the assemblage of all
my spare batteries, near at hand, of which I think there were
five or six, to spring into battery, on the right of this
field, and to open with canister at once. In the time 1 am
writing every stalk of corn in the northern and greater part
of the field was cut as closely as could have been done with a
knife, and the slain lay in rows precisely as they had stood
in their ranks a few moments before. It was never my fortune
to witness a more bloody, dismal battle-field." The survivors
beat a rapid retreat toward the church and there sought
shelter behind rocks, trees and stone fences. The Union men
pressed forward in close pursuit for some distance, but the
Confederates were rallied and reinforced, when the Federals
were in turn forced to fall back.
At this juncture Mansfield arrived, but while deploying
his men he fell mortally wounded and the command of the corps
fell on Gen. Williams, who had barely time to receive a few
general instructions from Hooker before he was forced to go
into the fight. Not knowing the exact position of the 1st
corps there was some lack of unity in the movements of the
various division commanders, but after nearly two hours of
hard fighting the enemy was driven back to the West woods.
Greene's division succeeded in turning Jackson's right and in
gaining a position in the edge of the woods near the Dunker
church, where he hung on tenaciously, repulsing several
attempts to dislodge him. In this part of the engagement the
Confederates suffered severely. J. .R Jones, who was in
command of Jackson's division, was wounded. Starke, who
succeeded him, was soon afterward killed. Lawton then took
command of the division and was wounded and borne from the
field. Nearly one-half the entire force on the Confederate
left were killed or wounded, and it is probable that if Sumner
had arrived at this time the entire Confederate army could
have been crushed. It was nearly 10 o'clock, however, before
Sumner's corps, some 18,000 strong, reached the field, coming
on in three columns. Sedgwick on the right occupied the
position from which Hooker had been driven earlier in the
action. Next came the divisions of French and Richardson, the
Union line now being extended well down toward the Boonsboro
road. Sedgwick's division went into battle in three lines.
The first had hardly become engaged when the Confederates made
a desperate rush, broke through the Union line and turned
Sedgwick's left. The third line was quickly faced about to
repel an attack from the rear, but the Confederate fire on the
left was so effective that the entire division was forced to
retire. Here Sedgwick was wounded, but he remained in the
saddle until his command was rallied and placed in a strong
position, where, under the command of Gen. Howard, it remained
throughout the rest of the battle.
The battle was gradually moving southward and after ten
o'clock there was no more serious fighting north of the
church. About half a mile south of the church a road leaves
the pike and, following a zigzag course, strikes the Boonsboro
road about half-way between Sharpsburg and the Antietam. For
some distance after leaving the pike this road was lower than
the ground on either side, forming a natural breastwork, and
was known as the sunken road. It was toward this road that
French and Richardson directed their movements. When Lee saw
that his left was defeated and his center in danger of being
broken, he brought up every available man from his right. In
quick succession the divisions of Walker, Anderson and McLaws
were hurled against Sumner's veterans. Sumner was reinforced
by part of Mansfield's corps and the Confederates were slowly
forced back every foot of the ground being stubbornly
contested, until their final stand was made at the sunken
road. In this part of the engagement the heavy guns of the
Union batteries east of the Antietam rendered important
service by preventing the enemy from using his artillery. D.
H. Hill, who commanded this part of the Confederate line,
says: "Our artillery could not cope with the superior weight,
caliber, range and number of the Yankee guns. They were
smashed up or withdrawn before they could be turned against
the massive columns of attack." At last Col. Barlow,
commanding the 1st brigade of Richardson's division, made a
successful flank movement on the road and captured about 300
men who still clung to it, more as a place of shelter than in
the hope of checking the Federal advance. The road was filled
with Confederate dead and is referred to in all descriptions
of the battle as the "Bloody Lane."
In his report of the battle of Antietam McClellan says:
"My plan for the impending general engagement was to attack
the enemy's left with the corps of Hooker and Mansfield,
supported by Sumner's, and if necessary by Franklin's and as
soon as matters looked favorably there to move the corps of
Burnside against the enemy's extreme right upon the ridge
running to the south and rear of Sharpsburg, and having
carried their position, to press along the crest toward our
right, and whenever either of these flank movements should be
successful, to advance our center with all the forces then
disposable." In pursuance of this plan the 9th corps was
stationed on the Federal left, with instructions to assault
and carry the Burnside bridge whenever an order to that effect
should be issued from headquarters. McClellan says that this
order was sent to Burnside at 8 a. m. on the 17th, while the
latter says he received it "about ten o'clock." The bridge
was guarded by Toombs, brigade, which occupied a strong
position among the rocks and trees on the bluff commanding the
west end of the bridge, while the bridge, the ford below, and
in fact, the entire valley, were all effectually covered by
the Confederate batteries. The first attempt to carry the
bridge was made by Crook's brigade of the Kanawha division,
with the 11th Conn. deployed as skirmishers to cover the
advance. The plan was to move the brigade across the bridge
in two columns of fours, which were to turn to the right and
left as soon as they reached the opposite bank, Rodman's
division meanwhile to try to cross at a ford about a third of
a mile farther down the creek. This plan failed because Crook
missed his way and reached the stream some distance above the
bridge, where he became engaged with the enemy on the west
bank. A second effort, made by the 2nd Md. and 6th N. H.
infantry, likewise proved a failure. The two regiments
charged across the bridge with fixed bayonets, but were met by
a withering fire of artillery and musketry and forced to fall
back. Gen. Cox, to whom Burnside had entrusted the work of
carrying the bridge, then directed Gen. Sturgis to select two
regiments from Ferrero's brigade and push them across the
bridge in accordance with the first plan. Sturgis selected
the 51st N. Y. and the 51st Penn. A howitzer from Simmonds,
battery was brought forward and placed where it covered the
west end of the bridge. When everything was in readiness the
strong skirmish line opened fire, the howitzer was operated
rapidly, throwing double charges of canister into the ranks of
Toombs' men, and under this protection the two regiments
advanced at the double-quick with fixed bayonets and dashed
across the bridge, the Confederates hastily retreating before
the impetuous charge. The remainder of Sturgis, division and
Crook's brigade were hurried over to the support of the two
gallant regiments, and these were soon further strengthened by
Rodman's division and Scammon's brigade, which had succeeded
in crossing at the ford. Here another delay ensued. Sturgis'
and Crook's men had almost exhausted their ammunition and a
halt was made necessary until their cartridge-boxes were
replenished. During the pause Willcox's division and several
light batteries were brought over, the remaining batteries
being planted on the hills east of the creek, and at 3 p.m.
the left wing began its advance on Sharpsburg. The
Confederates under D. R. Jones were soon encountered, drawn up
diagonally across the ridge, screened by stone fences, etc.,
and well supported by artillery. Welsh's and Christ's
brigades, which were in advance, drove them back after some
sharp fighting, until near the edge of the village, where
Jones made his final stand in an old orchard. From this
position he was routed by the batteries with Willcox's
division and the orchard was occupied by the infantry. In the
advance Rodman's division formed the extreme left, and as the
movement was made in the form of a right wheel he became
separated from Willcox, causing a break in the line and
throwing Rodman's brigades en echelon. To the south was a
field of tall corn, through which A. P. Hill's division, just
up from Harper's Ferry, was advancing in line of battle to
strike the left flank. They wore the blue uniforms captured
at the ferry and it was thought they were part of the Union
forces until they opened fire. Scammon quickly faced his
brigade to the left and held Hill in check until the line
could be reformed. In order to do this it was necessary for
Willcox and Crook to retire somewhat from their advanced
position, while Sturgis came up with his command to fill the
break in the line. This gave Jones an opportunity to retire
beyond Sharpsburg and take a position on the high ground where
the national cemetery is now located, but it no doubt saved
Rodman's division from being cut to pieces. This virtually
ended the battle of Antietam, and at the close the two armies
held the same relative positions they occupied at the
commencement of the fight.
The Union loss was 2,108 killed, 9,549 wounded and 753
captured or missing. According to Confederate reports Lee's
army lost 1,512 killed, 7,816 wounded and 1,844 captured or
missing, a much greater loss in proportion to the number of
troops engaged than that inflicted on the Federal forces.
Both sides claimed a victory and the engagement might well be
designated as a drawn battle. The 18th was spent by both
armies in resting the tired troops and in caring for the dead
and wounded. McClellan's intention was to renew the fight on
the 19th, but when the sun rose that morning it was discovered
that the enemy had evacuated his position during the night,
crossed the Potomac at a ford some distance below the
Shepherdstown road, and retired into Virginia. Lee's invasion
of Maryland was ended.
Source: The Union Army, vol. 5
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